United Nations A/73/401–S/2018/872

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda items 34, 67 and 76

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Prevention of armed conflict

The situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine

Report of the International Court of Justice

Letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a note verbale dated 21 September 2018 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the termination of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 67 and 76, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-16185 (E) 041018

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Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and in light of the approaching end of the current 10-year period of effectiveness of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (the "Treaty") has the honor to state the following.

«The strengthening of friendly relations, good-neighborliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation» between Ukraine and the Russian Federation - such purposes of the Treaty are described in its Preamble. As reflected in the first three articles of the Treaty, such friendly relations between the Parties can exist only when each treats the other as «equal and sovereign» (Article 1), respects the other's «territorial integrity» and «inviolability of the borders existing between them» (Article 2), and refrains from use of force, including economic or other means of pressure, and intervention in internal affairs (Article 3). The Treaty further recognizes that friendly relations are based on each Party's adherence to «good-faith performance of international obligations undertaken, as well as other universally recognized norms of international law» (Article 3).

These foundational principles — of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political and economic independence, and respect for international law — were incorporated into the Treaty to provide a basis for cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in various areas, including:

- Security: Under Article 4 and Articles 6 through 9, the Parties committed to cooperate on security and disarmament matters. In particular, they agreed specifically not to participate in hostile acts against each other, and not to allow their territories to be used to the detriment of the security of the other Party (Article 6). Further, under Article 33 of the Treaty, the Parties committed themselves to «combat ... terrorism in all its forms and manifestations»;

- Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Under Articles 10 through 12, each Party guarantees economic, social and cultural rights to the citizens of the other Party. The Parties agreed, that they would guarantee the citizens of the other Party «rights and freedoms on the same basis and to the same extent as it does its own citizens» (Article 10). They committed also to protect the rights of national minorities, including «the right of individuals who belong to national minorities to fully and effectively exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and with full equality under the law» (Article 12);

- Trade and Economy: Under Articles 13 through 16, the Parties agreed to cooperate with one another to grow bilateral trade and their respective economies. In particular, the Parties agreed to «ensure favorable conditions for direct trade relations» (Article 14) and «ensure the mutual protection of their investments» (Article 15);

- Transportation and Energy: Under Articles 17, 20, 22 and 29 of the Treaty, the Parties agreed to cooperate in developing and maintaining transportation and energy infrastructure, including «devoting particular attention to the development of cooperation in ensuring the functioning of national fuel-and-energy complexes» (Article 20). They agreed also to guarantee «freedom of transit of persons, freight, and vehicles» (Article 17) and, in this regard, to «develop maritime shipping and use sea lanes, seaports and maritime facilities» in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov (Article 29);

- Natural Resources of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov: The Parties committed to working together to utilize «the recreational potential and natural resources of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov» (Article 29);
- Environment: Under Articles 25 and 29 of the Treaty, the Parties agreed to cooperate in the areas of environmental protection and improvement, as well as other related areas. In particular, the Parties agreed to «further develop comprehensive cooperation in saving and preserving the natural environment of the Azov-Black Sea Basin» (Article 29).

The Russian Federation has ignored the fundamental principles of the Treaty, including threatening and then brazenly violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine, committing armed aggression against Ukraine and applying military and economic pressure to interfere in internal affairs of Ukraine, thus violating both the principle of sovereign equality and the rights of Ukrainian citizens.

In such circumstances and in the absence of good faith towards peaceful settlement of disputes concerning Russia's numerous and significant breaches of the Treaty, the extension of the Treaty for the next decade (2019-2029) is fundamentally impossible.

The Russian Federation, despite all efforts of Ukraine and the world community, still ignores appeals to stop its internationally unlawful acts, which violate all fundamental provisions of the Treaty, including but not limited to Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 17.

The Russian Federation refused to use the instruments of peaceful settlement of disputes, as provided by Article 7 of the Treaty and as required by Article 33 of the UN Charter (Note of MFA of Ukraine from 28 February 2014 №2774/2дснг), despite the fact that Ukraine through diplomatic channels (Note of MFA of Ukraine from 27 February 2014 №610/22-110-599) sent to the Russian Federation proposals to resort to them at the beginning of the unlawful use of force and the military aggression in the Spring of 2014.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine emphasizes, in accordance with Article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the termination of the Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine created under the Treaty prior to its termination.

Ukraine and the Russian Federation retain all their rights and obligations under the Treaty, created during its period of validity from 1 April 1999 through 31 March 2019. Ukraine continues to demand that the Russian Federation rectify its violations of the Treaty, respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, stop violations of the rights of Ukrainian citizens, as well as by provide full compensation for the damage caused by its violation of the Treaty.

Ukraine reaffirms its call on the Russian Federation to submit these and other fundamental outstanding disputes to the International Court of Justice.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine also emphasizes that the termination of the Treaty takes place without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under other effective bilateral treaties between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as multilateral agreements to which Ukraine and the Russian Federation are Parties, and other norms and principles of international.

Ukraine confirms its obligations under such treaties, norms and principles, and demands that the Russian Federation faithfully execute its obligations under them.

The termination of the Treaty is without prejudice to the existing judicial and other processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Taking into account all of the above and in accordance with Article 40 of the Treaty, the Ukrainian Side declares its wish to terminate the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation from 01 April 2019.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation the assurances of its consideration.

Kyiv, «21» September 2018

United Nations A/73/402

General Assembly

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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 136
Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019

Revised estimates relating to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under section 5, Peacekeeping operations

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to the adoption by the Security Council of its resolutions 2361 (2017) and 2394 (2017).

In paragraph 7 of its resolution 2361 (2017) and paragraph 7 of its resolution 2394 (2017), the Security Council welcomed the initial and limited return of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force contingent to Camp Faouar, as well as the cooperation of the parties to facilitate this return, together with continued efforts to plan for the Force's expeditious return to vacated positions in the area of separation, including the commencement of limited patrols around Camp Faouar and the provision of adequate force protection, based on a continuous assessment of security in the area.

In line with the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, the present report contains the revised estimates proposed for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under section 5, Peacekeeping operations, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, in the additional amount of $2,315,400.

18-16175 (E) 011018

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I. Introduction

1. In his progress report on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) of 5 June 1974 (S/11310), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the transfer of 90 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers deployed in the area to UNDOF, which had been established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974). In subsequent reports on UNDOF, the Secretary-General referred to UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF to assist in the implementation of its mandate, prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974. The UNTSO military observers in UNDOF serve in Observer Group Golan under the operational control of the UNDOF Force Commander. Observer Group Golan maintains five fixed and four temporary observation posts in the UNDOF area of operations in support of UNDOF activities. The UNTSO Chief of Staff maintains administrative command, including responsibility for the administrative aspects of Observer Group Golan, such as training and deployment of the military observers, provision of their equipment, and maintenance, refurbishment and reconstruction of their observation posts.

2. UNDOF and Observer Group Golan temporarily withdrew from some of their positions on the Bravo side in 2014 owing to the deterioration of the security situation. The goal for UNDOF, supported by Observer Group Golan, is its full return to the positions vacated. UNDOF continues to implement its plan for the Force and observers to return gradually to the Bravo side. The return of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan involves the rehabilitation and rebuilding of their positions and facilities at Camp Faouar and the enhancement of force protection.

3. In its resolutions 2361 (2017) and 2394 (2017), the Security Council welcomed the initial and limited return of UNDOF to Camp Faouar on the Bravo side and the continued efforts to plan for the Force's expeditious return to vacated positions in the area of separation, including the commencement of limited patrols around Camp Faouar and the provision of adequate force protection, based on a continuous assessment of security in the area.

4. Observer Group Golan has long conducted mandated observation activities on the Golan. With the escalation of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2014, UNDOF needed to withdraw temporarily from observation posts and from other positions, curtailing the majority of operations in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side monitored under the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Owing to the rapid withdrawal, the UNDOF Camp Faouar headquarters and Observer Group Golan observation posts were left unprotected, with considerable loss of equipment and facility damage.

5. Following recent security improvements on the Golan, the UNDOF technical assessment carried out with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (integrated planning team) on the resumption of activities on the Bravo side determined that conditions on the ground would permit the accelerated return of the observers to the area of activity. As the security situation now allows for the gradual resumption of operations by UNDOF and Observer Group Golan, observation posts 71 and 72 in the area of separation have been identified as initial priorities to enable observation activities to recommence.

6. The General Assembly by its resolution 72/263 A on the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, appropriated the total amount of $67,161,300 for UNTSO for the biennium 2018–2019. Owing to the timeline for consideration of the UNTSO budget proposal and the uncertainty of future security conditions at the time, the resource requirements for the return to Camp Faouar were not included in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019. Accordingly, the new

requirements for the observers to gradually resume operations on the Bravo side are being sought in the present report.

II. Relationship of the current proposals to the biennial programme plan and programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019

7. The current proposals relate to programme 4, Peacekeeping operations, of the biennial programme plan for the period 2018–2019 (A/71/6/Rev.1) and to section 5, Peacekeeping operations, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019.

8. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and external factors as included in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (see A/72/6 (Sect. 5) and A/72/6 (Sect. 5)/Corr.1) remain unchanged.

9. The proposed resource requirements for the implementation of the gradual return of Observer Group Golan to the Bravo side as envisaged under the second and third phases of the UNDOF plan amount to $2,315,400. The requested resources relate to the rebuilding of observation posts 71 and 72, as well as the one-time purchase of information technology and communications equipment, observation equipment and office accommodation, furniture and equipment for observation posts 71 and 72, as well as for Observer Group Golan, UNTSO headquarters and Camp Faouar.

10. Owing to the operational developments in the Syrian-controlled Golan (Bravo side) and increasing government recovery of and stabilization efforts in the UNDOF area of responsibility, operational activities in the areas of separation and limitation are projected to increase as the security situation improves, including an increase in mobile patrols by Observer Group Golan and UNDOF in the area of limitation. Joint Observer Group Golan and UNDOF patrolling is being increased from one to two patrols per week during the third quarter of 2018, and to three patrols per week in the fourth quarter. In 2019, patrols are projected to increase to four per week in the first six months, doubling to eight per week in the second six months.

11. The additional outputs to be delivered from the gradual return of Observer Group Golan to the Bravo side of the Golan during the biennium 2018–2019 are reflected in table 1.

Table 1
Categories of outputs and final outputs

Outputs	*Quantity*
Other substantive activities (regular budget)	
Good offices, fact-finding and other special missions:	
1. Static observations: daily observations from 2 observation posts on the Bravo side with 3 military observers each from Observer Group Golan (number of man-days)	1 095
2. Mobile operations for area familiarization training and patrols in the Bravo side area of operations for Observer Group Golan (number of patrol-man-days)	754
3. Inspections and investigations on the Bravo side for Observer Group Golan	24

III. Resource requirements

12. Additional resource requirements for the proposals contained in the present report for the biennium 2018–2019 under section 5, Peacekeeping operations, amount

to $2,315,400, as summarized in tables 2 and 3 by component and by object of expenditure.

Table 2
Resource requirements by component
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Regular budget	*2018–2019 initial appropriation*	*Additional requirements for 2018–2019*	*2018–2019 revised estimates*
Department of Peacekeeping Operations	10 495.4	–	10 495.4
Department of Field Support	8 291.0	–	8 291.0
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	67 161.3	2 315.4	69 476.7
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	19 754.4	–	19 754.4
Total (net of staff assessment)	**105 702.1**	**2 315.4**	**108 017.5**

13. The distribution of resources for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization is reflected in table 3.

Table 3
Resource requirements for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization by object of expenditure
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*2018–2019 initial appropriation*	*Additional requirements for 2019*	*2018–2019 revised estimates*
Posts	43 743.2	–	43 743.2
Other staff costs	13 891.5	187.9	14 079.4
Travel of staff	600.7	26.4	627.1
Contractual services	658.5	8.5	667.0
General operating expenses	4 938.0	11.7	4 949.7
Hospitality	13.3	–	13.3
Supplies and materials	1 151.3	138.4	1 289.7
Furniture and equipment	1 346.4	669.9	2 016.3
Improvement of premises	818.4	1 272.6	2 091.0
Total	**67 161.3**	**2 315.4**	**69 476.7**

14. The amount of $2,315,400 would provide for non-post requirements to support the gradual resumption of observation activities on the Bravo side of the Golan for the biennium 2018–2019 through the construction of accommodation and office space in Camp Faouar, logistical support and the deployment of observers.

15. The proposed resources would provide for other staff costs for the payment of mission subsistence allowance for 9 military observers based in Lebanon who would move to the Bravo side in 2019 ($187,900); travel of staff for the supervision of the construction of the communication towers of the two observation posts on the Bravo side ($26,400); contractual services for centrally provided support for office automation equipment at Camp Faouar and observation posts 71 and 72 ($8,500); general operating expenses for commercial communications services, such as local and long-distance telephone, mobile data, satellite mobile charges and Internet

connectivity ($11,700); supplies and materials, including petrol, oil and lubricants for UNTSO vehicles, to be used mainly for Observer Group Golan mobile patrol activities on the Bravo side, four generators at observation posts 71 and 72, data processing, consumable supplies, telecommunications equipment supplies and operational equipment supplies ($138,400); furniture and equipment, including the replacement of communications equipment, observation equipment, office furniture and equipment, and safety and security equipment ($669,900); and improvement of premises for the reconstruction of observation posts 71 and 72 ($1,272,600).

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

16. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the additional resources proposed in the amount of $2,315,400 for UNTSO;**

(b) **To appropriate an additional amount of $2,315,400 (net of staff assessment) for UNTSO under section 5, Peacekeeping operations, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, which would represent a charge against the contingency fund.**

Organizational structure and post distribution for the biennium 2018–2019



United Nations A/73/403

General Assembly

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3 October 2018

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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 101 (hh)
General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament

Letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as coordinator for issues related to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in New York.

I am pleased to inform that the member States of the Agency have adopted a declaration on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September 2018) (see annex),* the circulation of which as a document of the General Assembly has been requested.

I should therefore be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 101 (hh).

(*Signed*) Mauro **Vieira**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-16420 (E) 081018

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Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration of the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September 2018)

The member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL),

Conscious of their historic commitment to nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirming that a world without nuclear weapons is essential for the accomplishment of the priority objectives of humanity, those being peace, security, development, and the protection of the natural environment,

Recognising that to achieve and maintain a world free from nuclear weapons is a responsibility shared by all Member States of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, a violation of International Law, including International Humanitarian Law, and constitute a crime against humanity,

Proud to belong to Latin America and the Caribbean, the first densely populated region in the world that, by means of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), established a nuclear-weapon-free zone on 14 February 1967,

Recalling that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been rigorously complied with by its States Party for more than 50 years, relying on the permanent work of OPANAL, the only international intergovernmental organization specializing in non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating the full validity of the declarations on nuclear disarmament adopted by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on 20 August 2013, in Buenos Aires; on 29 January 2014, in Havana; on 29 January 2015, in Belen; on 27 January 2016, in Quito; and on 25 January 2017, in Punta Cana,

Conscious that the Treaty of Tlatelolco and OPANAL are political, judicial and institutional references for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Reiterating also their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is closely related to the maintenance of international peace and security and that the prohibition of nuclear weapons in different regions, adopted by sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, has a beneficial influence over other regions,

Emphasising their rejection of nuclear weapons, which, after more than 70 years of existence and use, continue to pose a risk to international peace and security and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable,

Highlighting the importance of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2017: 72/30 "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons"; and 72/37 "Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world",

which represent important political advances towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons,

Fully aware of the obligation set forth in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the unequivocal commitment of nuclear weapon States to negotiate effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that the prohibition of nuclear weapons is a means to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner within clearly established timeframes and that elimination is the only truly effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

The Member States of OPANAL,

Join in the commemoration, on 26 September 2018, of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by resolution 68/32 (2013) of the United Nations General Assembly;

On this occasion, the Member States:

1. ***Call attention to*** the adoption and ***recall*** the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

2. ***Consider*** that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the soon entry into force of both instruments will join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the road towards the elimination of those weapons of mass destruction in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner within clearly established timeframes;

3. ***Reiterate their concern*** over the existence of about 15 thousand nuclear weapons that pose an unacceptable threat to humankind, a danger that becomes more serious by the day;

4. ***Recall*** that this concern is reflected in numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, including Res. 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, as well as in the preamble of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean of 1967, and in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, and in the preamble of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

5. ***Also recall*** that the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I), in 1978, affirmed in its Final Document[1] that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization", and such situation has not changed;

6. ***Reiterate*** the commitment of the States of the region endorsed in the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace to continue to promote nuclear disarmament as a priority objective and to contribute to general and complete disarmament in order to favour the strengthening of trust between nations;

[1] A/S-10/2.

7. ***Firmly demand*** that nuclear weapons not be used again, under any circumstances by any actor, which can only be assured by the prohibition and the subsequent transparent, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons;

8. ***Reiterate*** the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines and policies and to comply fully with their legal obligations and unequivocal commitments to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay;

9. ***Firmly demand*** that nuclear-weapon States cease the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of these weapons, and cease to propose new scenarios and procedures for the development and employment of these arms, which is inconsistent with the obligation to adopt effective measures towards nuclear disarmament;

10. ***Call upon*** all States to refrain from carrying out nuclear weapon test explosions, or any other non-explosive experiment, including subcritical experiments for the improvement of nuclear weapons; such actions are contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), thus undermining its desired impact as a nuclear disarmament measure;

11. ***Urge*** the States included in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),[2] that have not ratified the Treaty, to take the necessary measures to do so as soon as possible;

12. ***Reiterate*** that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, is vital to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to international security; and in this regard, ***call upon*** all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States, without further delay and without conditions;

13. ***Express*** their determination to work for the success of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

14. ***Recognize*** the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of the safeguards agreements in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

15. ***Confirm*** the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination;

16. ***Urge*** nuclear-weapon States that made interpretative declarations concerning Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that are contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, to review the propositions made by OPANAL with the aim of resolving this problem in order to give full and unequivocal security assurances to the States that comprise the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as to respect the militarily denuclearized character of the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

17. ***Underline*** the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an instrument for nuclear disarmament and, in this regard, ***encourage*** the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones by means of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned;

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[2] The People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United States of America, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the State of Israel, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

18. ***Regret*** the more than two-decade failure to comply with the resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,[3] an integral part of the commitments of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and of the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

19. ***Reiterate*** their commitment to continue to promote the dialogue and cooperation among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, including Mongolia, through, *inter alia*, the convening, in 2020, of a fourth conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia;

20. ***Reiterate further*** their conviction that the dissemination of information concerning the danger posed by nuclear weapons is essential so that society as a whole may join the efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons;

21. ***Undertake*** to continue to work for the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education programmes, convinced that they are an effective means to contribute to the consolidation of international peace and security.

26 September 2018.

[3] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex.

United Nations A/73/404

General Assembly

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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 74 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine

Note by the Secretariat

1. The General Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 72/190 on the situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, requested the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare, by the end of its seventy-second session, the second dedicated thematic report on the situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine.

2. Pursuant to that request, the report of the Office of the High Commissioner is made available, in the language of submission only, in a conference room paper (A/HRC/39/CRP.4).

18-16398 (E) 031018

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United Nations A/73/405–S/2018/876

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
4 October 2018
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda item 38
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 21 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of August 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-16516 (E) 091018 111018

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Annex to the identical letters dated 21 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in August 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	0640 1130	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, several explosions and bursts of light- and medium-weapon fire were heard.
	1519	From a location near its south Rumaysh position inside occupied Palestinian territory, the Israeli enemy pointed the cannon of a Merkava tank towards an Observer Group Lebanon patrol that was on the other side, inside Lebanese territory.
3 August	1745	As the herder Hasan Zahra was tending a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, Birkat al-Naqqar district, an Israeli enemy patrol fired in the air towards him, but did not strike anyone. He was able to flee with his herd towards the town.
4 August	1200 1345	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the sound of several bursts of light and medium automatic-weapon fire was heard coming from the perimeter of the Radar post.
6 August	0800	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Yarun, between points B45(1) and B46, the Israeli enemy used an excavator to clear scrub. In the process, the excavator breached the technical fence without violating the Blue Line. At 1400 hours, as a Lebanese Army patrol was monitoring the work from the Lebanese side, members of the enemy patrol directed insults and offensive language at and armed and pointed their weapons towards the Lebanese Army patrol. This incident occurred in the presence a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol. At 1600 hours, the Israeli enemy finished its work, and the excavator and the personnel left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1800 2020	On the outskirts of Marun al-Ra's and Aytarun, near point BP23, inside Lebanese territory, a fire broke out across a large area (approximately 2 km) of scrub and trees, causing a landmine that had been left behind by the Israeli enemy to explode.
7 August	1130	On the outskirts of Yarun, as a Lebanese Army patrol was near the Hadab al-Bustan post along the border with occupied Palestinian territory, the cannon of an Israeli enemy Merkava tank was pointed directly at the personnel of the Lebanese Army patrol.
9 August	1145 0300	On the outskirts of Yarun, opposite points B48 and B49, inside Lebanese territory, a fire broke out across a large area (approximately 100 dunums) of scrub and trees, causing two landmines that had been left behind by the Israeli enemy to explode.
13 August	1700	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, at the Duhayrah Gate position, as the Israeli enemy was firing live ammunition, bullets reached Lebanese territory and flew above homes in Duhayrah town.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2300 2330	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, two flares were observed over the Radar position.
14 August	1020	Opposite the town of Rumaysh, as a routine Lebanese Army patrol along the Blue Line was inspecting the area between points B36 and BP14, inside Lebanese territory, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 10 personnel, 1 Merkava tank and 2 Hummer vehicles arrived on the other side of the Blue Line. The enemy personnel pointed their weapons, the tank's cannon and the medium weapons attached to the Hummer vehicles towards the Lebanese Army patrol personnel. The enemy patrol also launched six smoke grenades, two of which fell in occupied Palestinian territory while the other four fell in Lebanese territory, causing two members of the Lebanese patrol to choke and setting fire to the area between the above-mentioned points. The fire extended into occupied territory. A patrol from the liaison unit of UNIFIL and members of the Civil Defence arrived at the scene, and the latter proceeded to extinguish the fire on the Lebanese side. A fire brigade from the occupied territories also arrived at the scene and extinguished the fire on the side of the occupied Palestinian territories.
15 August	1000	Opposite the town of Ramiya (points BP10 and BP10 (1)), an 11-person Israeli enemy patrol took up positions behind the earthen berm and pointed their weapons towards some Lebanese farmers who were working on their land. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1430 hours.
16 August	2230	From inside occupied territory, opposite Sahl al-Khiyam, near point B90, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles approached. Four soldiers disembarked and carried out maintenance work on the technical fence. They also directed searchlights towards Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy completed the work at 2300 hours and the vehicles and soldiers departed towards occupied territory.
17 August	1100	Opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the members of an Israeli enemy patrol pointed machine guns towards a Lebanese Army patrol as it conducted routine reconnaissance activity along the border.
20 August	0825	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two trucks, a winch crane, two pickup trucks and a Bobcat vehicle continued building the separation wall by putting into place 18 T-wall units between points B82 (1) and B82 (2). At 1100 hours, the enemy brought a Merkava tank to the Jabal al-Tayyarah position and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory. The tank was removed at 1300 hours. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1500 hours and the vehicles returned to occupied territory.
	0830	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Aytarun, as an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, an excavator and two civilian pickup trucks was clearing scrub along the technical fence, a member of that patrol pointed a 12.7 mm gun attached to a Hummer vehicle towards Lebanese Army personnel.
	1100	As the Israeli enemy was completing construction work inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the enemy brought in a Merkava tank and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 August	0945	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1135	
25 August	1500	On the outskirts of town, between points BP5 and B11 in Alma al-Sha'b, as a Lebanese Army patrol was reconnoitring an area along the border with the occupied Palestinian territories, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 4 Humvee vehicles, 2 all-terrain vehicles and approximately 20 personnel arrived on the opposite side. The members of the enemy patrol armed their weapons and pointed them towards the Lebanese Army personnel, who carried on with their activities. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1630 hours.
29 August	1040	A team from the UNIFIL liaison unit and a Lebanese Army patrol were visiting points BP12 and BP14, opposite the town of Rumaysh. When they reached point BP14, a five-person Israeli enemy patrol arrived on the opposite side, inside occupied Palestinian territory. Two members of the enemy patrol pointed their weapons towards the UNIFIL liaison unit team and the Lebanese Army patrol. At 1230 hours, the hostile patrol left in the direction of occupied territory and the UNIFIL liaison unit team and the Lebanese Army patrol left the area at 1250 hours.

Sea violations committed in August 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	0630	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for one hour and 20 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 70 metres. The crew of the launch sounded warning sirens to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters and detonated two noise bombs. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2110	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 30 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The crew of the launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens, used searchlights, broadcast obscenities over loudspeakers, fired a flare and detonated two noise bombs in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2129	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period. The crew of that launch also launched a noise bomb, broadcast obscenities over loudspeakers and sounded warning sirens for 30 seconds towards Lebanese territorial waters.
	2130	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 August	0510	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour, proceeding on its way for some 105 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights and loudspeakers, and detonated two noise bombs in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 August	0135	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0137	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0140	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four hours and 50 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 345 metres. The crew of the launch fired two flares and used loudspeakers and searchlights in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 August	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 5 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 120 metres. The crew of the launch broadcast over loudspeakers and detonated three noise bombs to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
6 August	1018	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1826	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
7 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 12 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0505	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 25 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0947	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 28 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 296 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute and launched two noise bombs inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0506	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1006	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 56 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1229	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1804	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
9 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 34 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The crew of the launch used loudspeakers and searchlights to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The crew also launched four noise bombs and fired one flare. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0610	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 16 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 August	1907	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 111 metres over a two-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 August	0525	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 50 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 90 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The crew also launched five noise bombs and fired one flare. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1811	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 295 metres over a three-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 45 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 100 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0717	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one minute, proceeding on its way for some 445 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0748 hours, it violated the boundary again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 August	0929	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 48 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0940	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 16 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 538 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1819	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 482 metres over an eight-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 August	1910	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 August	0215	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 15 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 375 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights, warning sirens and loudspeakers to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0220	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes.
18 August	0232	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes.
	0238	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	0240	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1813	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 37 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 92 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
19 August	1817	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 13 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2326 hours, it violated the boundary again for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 482 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2352 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2337	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	2355	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for four minutes.
20 August	1139	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6423 (2011) for 32 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 575 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1823 hours, it violated the boundary again for 11 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 335 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
21 August	1821	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 288 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 August	1756	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1838 hours, it violated the boundary again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 405 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 August	1809	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 August	1834	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
25 August	0850	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1055	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1102	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 26 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1135	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1150	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one minute, proceeding on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2123	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
28 August	1816	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 480 metres over a five-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 August	1814	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 390 metres over a six-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
31 August	1157	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for eight minutes, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1430	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 203 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1611	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 42 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 463 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1720	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 13 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in August 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1805 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2245 hours over Yarun.
2 August	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1315	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea west of Sidon, Khaldah, Damur and the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0140 hours on 3 August over Naqurah.
3 August	0115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0425 hours over Rumaysh.
	0825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2110 hours over Rumaysh.
	2050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0410 hours on 4 August over Kafr Killa.
4 August	0400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1115 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Rumaysh.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0240 hours on 5 August over Yarun.
5 August	0240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0720 hours over Rumaysh.
	0600	The Israeli enemy operated a training aircraft inside occupied Palestinian territory between points B82 and B83, opposite Kafr Killa. At 0730 hours, the aircraft twice violated Lebanese airspace over a five-minute period before leaving at 0750 hours towards occupied territory.
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1645 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda, Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Killa.
6 August	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Rumaysh.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1800	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
7 August	0030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1445 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1505	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2035 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2130 hours over the sea off Sarafand.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0515 hours on 8 August over Rumaysh.
	2105	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over Shikka, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2245 hours over Rumaysh.
8 August	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Rumaysh.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0155 hours on 9 August over Rumaysh.
9 August	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2315 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1105 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Batrun and the South before leaving at 1510 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours on 10 August over Rumaysh.
	2320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Sarafand and Tyre before leaving at 0105 hours on 10 August over the sea west of Tyre.
10 August	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2110 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Sidon. It circled over the sea off Sidon and to the west of Naqurah before leaving at 1505 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2300 hours over Kafr Killa.
11 August	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Rashayya and the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
	1325	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2040 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0455 hours on 12 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
12 August	0430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0550 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1140 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf and Alayh before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Rumaysh.
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0540 hours on 13 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 August	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1825 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekka, the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Alayh before leaving at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
	2225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 0100 hours on 14 August over Naqurah.
14 August	0330	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0940 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Rumaysh.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1125 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled between Adlun and Naqurah before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2225 hours over Aytarun.
	1740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Yarun.
	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0020 hours on 15 August over Rumaysh.
15 August	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0745 hours over Rumaysh.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Matn, Kasrawan. Jubayl, Zahlah and Riyaq before leaving at 1815 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf, Alayh, Beirut and its suburbs, and Ba'abda before leaving at 2250 hours over Naqurah.
	2135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0235 hours on 16 August over Kafr Killa.
16 August	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, and Ba'abda before leaving at 1545 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0330 hours on 17 August over Naqurah.
	1250	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1350 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0230 hours on 17 August over Naqurah.
17 August	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Matn, Ba'abda, Beirut and the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Rumaysh.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1350 hours over Naqurah.
	1250	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Yarun.
18 August	0100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1220 hours over Rumaysh.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Rumaysh.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours on 19 August over Rumaysh.
19 August	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Zahlah and Jubb Jannin before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 2225 hours over Naqurah.
	2200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0620 hours on 20 August over Aytarun.
20 August	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1345 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1310 hours over Yarun.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1310 hours over Yarun.
	1430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It disappeared from radar screens over Ba'abda and reappeared over the South before leaving at 1935 hours over Rumaysh.
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0305 hours on 21 August over Rumaysh.
21 August	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Jubayl before leaving at 2200 hours over Naqurah.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1820	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1930 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0700 hours on 22 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 August	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1605 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0915 hours on 23 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
23 August	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1530 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They proceeded to a point above the sea west of Shikka before leaving at 1225 hours over the sea west of Shikka.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1245	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1325 hours over Naqurah.
	1515	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
	2255	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0605 hours on 24 August over Rumaysh.
24 August	0555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0735 hours over Yarun.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 0200 hours on 25 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0600 hours on 25 August over Rumaysh.
25 August	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1150 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1855 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b, and proceeded to circle between points BP5 and BP11.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2355 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
26 August	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0925 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0940 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1205	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1425 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 0110 hours on 27 August over Kafr Killa.
	1440	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1555 hours over Rumaysh.
	1445	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1540 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0100 hours on 27 August over Rumaysh.
27 August	0040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0545 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0810 hours over Naqurah.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Alayh and the Shuf before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1205 hours over Naqurah.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2320 hours over Yarun.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 August	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1300 hours over Naqurah.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0240 hours on 29 August over Aytarun.
29 August	0540	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1205 hours over Rumaysh.
	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2000 hours over Naqurah.
	1240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They left at 1250 hours over the sea west of Shikka, heading towards Turkey.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left at 1305 hours over the sea west of Naqurah, heading towards Turkey.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left at 1315 hours over the sea west of Naqurah, heading towards Turkey.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 1910 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0030 hours on 30 August over Rumaysh.
30 August	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2125 hours over Naqurah.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0300 hours on 31 August over Naqurah.
31 August	0120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 0730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2145 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1415	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1540 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1740 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

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General Assembly

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Seventy-third session
Agenda items 45 and 78

Question of Cyprus

Oceans and the law of the sea

Letter dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I regret to bring to your attention the provocative acts on the part of Turkey against fishing vessels flying the flag of Cyprus both within the maritime zones of Cyprus and on the high seas.

In particular, on 16 August 2018, Turkish patrol vessels harassed and prevented the fishing vessel *Maria Bouboulina* under the flag of Cyprus from carrying out scheduled fishing activities duly licensed by the Department of Fisheries and Marine Research of Cyprus. Moreover, the Turkish patrol boats ordered the fishing vessel to abandon the area, otherwise the vessel and her crew would be arrested.

The incident took place at a distance between 14.5 and 30 nautical miles from the south-eastern coast of Turkey. Since Turkey has proclaimed neither a contiguous zone nor an exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea, its maritime jurisdiction is confined solely to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. Hence, the harassment occurred on the high seas.

In addition, on 30 August 2018, Turkish patrol vessels attempted to board the *Maria Bouboulina* with a view to inspecting the vessel while she was performing fishing activities on the high seas at a distance of 21 nautical miles from the Turkish coast. Even though the captain ceased the fishing activities and attempted to leave the area, the Turkish vessels kept harassing the *Maria Bouboulina* for another 30 minutes until the captain informed them that he would change course and head to a Cypriot port.

By virtue of articles 87 (1) (e) and 116 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, fishing on the high seas constitutes an aspect of the customary principle of the freedom of the seas. A corollary of the freedom of the seas, as envisaged in article 89 of the Convention, is that no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. It is the flag State that enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag on the high seas (article 92 of the Convention).

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Please recycle

Bearing in mind the above, it is clear that the conduct of the Turkish patrol vessels was in breach of the freedom of fishing on the high seas and contravened the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, namely Cyprus.

What is more, on 21 September 2018, vessels of the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus harassed and arrested the fishing vessel *Geia sou kaiki mou Ai Nikola*, flying the flag of Cyprus, within the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Cyprus at a distance of 7.5 nautical miles from Cape Kormakitis, situated on the northern coast of Cyprus. Since then, the vessel and her crew, which are of Egyptian nationality, have been illegally detained by Turkey's occupying forces and its illegal subordinate administration.

Since the arrested vessel was operating within the Cypriot territorial sea, it is only the authorities of Cyprus who have the power to regulate and monitor fishing activities in that area on the basis of articles 19 (2) (i) and 21 (1) (d) and (e) of the Convention, as well as of the relevant provisions of national legislation.

Even if Turkey — regrettably — has yet to become a party to the Convention, it is still bound by the aforementioned rules relating to the territorial sea and the high seas, which form part of customary international law, and must be held responsible for its internationally wrongful acts.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus kindly requests your assistance in conveying a strong message to Ankara to the effect that the Republic of Turkey must comply with international law, namely that it must observe the customary principle of the freedom of the high seas, including the freedom of fishing therein. Furthermore, Turkey is under an obligation to refrain from acts exacerbating tension in the area and to respect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus over vessels flying the latter's flag and its authority to regulate fishing activities within its territorial sea.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 45 and 78, and have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and in the next *Law of the Sea Bulletin*.

(*Signed*) Kornelios S. **Korneliou**

United Nations A/73/407

General Assembly

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4 October 2018
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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 15
Culture of peace

Letter dated 27 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to address you in reference to the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in New York on 26 September 2018, on the theme "Upholding the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement: towards a culture of peace", on the sidelines of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly.

In this regard, and in accordance with established practice, I am pleased to transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of the political declaration adopted at that time (see annex),* while respectfully requesting the circulation of the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15.

(*Signed*) Samuel **Moncada**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations
Special Presidential Commissioner for NAM Affairs

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-16505 (E) 091018

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Annex to the letter dated 27 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Political declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement on the theme "Upholding the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement: towards a culture of peace"

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), gathered on 26 September 2018, on the margins of the High-Level Segment of the 73rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in New York, undertook a review of the state of the international situation, particularly on the importance of upholding both the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as those that are at the core of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with a view to effectively moving towards a culture of peace, and decided:

1. To reaffirm and underscore the Movement's abiding faith in and strong commitment to its founding principles, ideals and purposes, particularly in establishing a peaceful and prosperous world and a just and equitable world order, as well as to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

2. To reaffirm the continued relevance, validity, and adherence to all principled positions and decisions of the Movement, particularly those contained in its Final Document, as adopted by the Ministers of the Movement during the XVIII Mid-Term Ministerial Conference of Baku.

3. To further reaffirm the provisions of the Declaration of Havana on the Purposes and Principles and the Role of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the Current International Juncture (2006), as well as the Declaration of Island of Margarita (2016) and the Declaration of Baku (2018).

4. To reaffirm that the United Nations, its Charter, and international law remain indispensable tools and central in the preservation and maintenance of international peace and security and the strengthening of international cooperation.

5. To uphold the principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of any State or Nation; to take effective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace; to defend, promote, and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force, including aggressive military exercises against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; to develop friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in their struggle against foreign occupation; to achieve international cooperation based on solidarity among peoples and governments in solving international problems of a political, economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character; and to promote and encourage the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, particularly as we observe the 70th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

6. To reaffirm that the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the principles and rules of international law are indispensable in preserving and promoting peace and security, the rule of law, economic development and social progress, and human rights for all. In this context, UN Member States, including those of the Security

Council, are called to renew their commitment to respect, defend, preserve, and promote the UN Charter and international law, with the aim of making further progress to achieving full respect for international law.

7. To underline that the strict observance of the principles of international law and the fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed by States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, and to reaffirm that NAM Member States shall respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, political independence and inviolability of international borders of Member States; and remain committed to support and promote these principles of international law. Accordingly, they reaffirm their determination to refrain from any action against the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of any State or inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. To reiterate their concern over the increasing tendency and deepening by certain States to resort to unilateralism, arbitrariness and unilaterally imposed measures, non-fulfillment of the commitments and obligations assumed under the relevant international legally binding instruments especially on weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons treaties, terrorism, conflicts, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the use of double standards in international relations, the continuing failure and unwillingness of the majority of the developed countries to fulfill their commitments in the economic and social fields.

9. To reiterate their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed measures that undermine the UN Charter and international law, and further reiterated its commitment to promoting, preserving and strengthening multilateralism and the multilateral decision-making process through the UN, by strictly adhering to its Charter and international law, with the aim of creating a just and equitable world order and global democratic governance.

10. To oppose unilateralism and unilaterally imposed measures by certain States which can lead to the erosion and violation of the UN Charter, international law and human rights, the use and threat of use of force, and pressure and coercive measures as a means to achieving their national policy objectives.

11. To refrain from recognizing, adopting or implementing extra-territorial or unilateral coercive measures or laws, including unilateral economic sanctions, other intimidating measures, and arbitrary travel restrictions, that seek to exert pressure on Non-Aligned Countries — threatening their sovereignty and independence, and their freedom of trade and investment — and prevent them from exercising their right to decide, by their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems, where such measures or laws constitute flagrant violations of the UN Charter, international law, the multilateral trading system as well as the norms and principles governing friendly relations among States; and in this regard, oppose and condemn these measures or laws and their continued application, persevere with efforts to effectively reverse them and urge other States to do likewise, as called for by the General Assembly and other UN organs; request States applying these measures or laws to revoke them fully and immediately.

12. To oppose all attempts to impose on any State any particular model of political, economic, legal or cultural system, which may lead to global instability and weaken the security of States and their peoples.

13. To reaffirm that solidarity, the highest expression of respect, friendship and peace among States, is a broad concept encompassing the sustainability of international relations, the peaceful coexistence, and the transformative objectives of

equity and empowerment of developing countries, whose ultimate goal is to achieve the full economic and social development of their peoples.

14. To continue to maintain, strengthen, and manifest the unity and solidarity among the membership of the Movement, particularly with those Non-Aligned Countries whose peoples are living under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation, or living in poverty or suffering ill-health, or victims of natural disasters, as well as those experiencing external threats of use of force, acts of aggression or unilateral coercive measures, including sanctions.

15. To reaffirm their determination that if any Member of the Movement suffers harm, whether this is economic, political or military in nature, or in terms of its security, as well as from the politicization of human rights, or if a Member suffers harm as a result of the imposition of unilateral sanctions or embargos, the Movement should express its solidarity with the affected country through the provision of political, moral, material and other forms of assistance. To this end, they will continue to review the Movement's existing mechanisms and explore new mechanisms for rendering such assistance, if necessary.

16. To reaffirm and stress their principled positions concerning peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, and on the non-use or threat of use of force, including through the promotion of political understanding and constructive dialogue among States, on the basis of mutual respect.

17. To promote a culture of peace based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, right to self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination, prevention of violence, promotion of non-violence, strict adherence to the principles of international relations as enshrined in the UN Charter, and full realization of all human rights, including the right to development.

18. To promote and preserve dialogue among civilizations, culture of peace and inter-faith dialogue, which would contribute towards peace and security, taking into account the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and the Declaration on the Enhancement of Effectiveness of the Principles of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.

19. To continue working towards the promotion of dialogue and understanding among all civilizations, cultures and religions and reaffirmed their commitment to work together to prevent cultural homogenization and domination or incitement to hatred and discrimination, combat defamation of religions and develop better ways for promoting tolerance, respect for and protection of the freedom of religion and belief, including the right to preserve one's cultural identity.

20. To reaffirm their commitment to enhancing the dialogue among civilizations and religions, through supporting efforts made at the international level towards reducing confrontation, promoting respect for diversity based on justice, fraternity and equality, and to oppose all attempts of uniculturalism or the imposition of particular models of political, economic, social, legal or cultural systems, and to promote dialogue among civilizations, culture of peace and inter-faith dialogue, which will contribute towards peace, security, stability, sustainable development and promotion of human rights.

21. To reaffirm their determination to advance in the enhancement of the status and role of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an anti-war peace-loving force, including through its instrumentalization as a Front for World Peace, and in favor, in particular,

of the respect of the right to life and the inalienable right of the peoples to their self-determination and independence.

22. To promote and work towards creating a multi-polar world through the strengthening of multilateralism through the UN and the multilateral processes, which are indispensable in promoting and preserving the interests of Non-Aligned Countries.

23. To underline the initiatives undertaken by Member States of the Movement for promoting peace, tolerance, inclusion, understanding and solidarity, inter alia, in line with the provisions of resolution 72/130 of 8 December 2017, by which the General Assembly of the United Nations encourages the promotion of the reconciliation to help to ensure peace and sustainable development, including by working with communities, faith leaders and other relevant actors, through reconciliatory measures and acts of service and by encouraging forgiveness and compassion among individuals.

24. To acknowledge initiatives by NAM Member States for promoting peace based on high ethical values, justice and friendship in order to denounce acts of aggression and to reinforce and promote stability, tranquility and durable peace throughout the world, bearing in mind that the current challenges faced by the international community need to be resolutely addressed by all nations through an inclusive multilateralism.

25. To initiate further vigorous, transparent and inclusive initiatives to achieve the realization of multilateral cooperation in the areas of economic development and social progress, peace and security, and human rights for all and the rule of law, including through enhancing the Movement's unity, solidarity and cohesiveness on issues of collective concern and interests, with the aim of shaping the multilateral agenda to embrace development as a fundamental priority, which should take into account the need for developing and developed countries and international institutions to intensify partnerships and coordinate their efforts and resources to effectively address all imbalances in the global agenda.

26. To continue to enhance the efforts of the NAM members in promoting and preserving multilateralism, the culture of peace and dialogue among civilizations, religions, and cultures, through various activities, including international and regional conferences and fora. In this regard, they agreed to initiate consultations among the Member States and Movement, to be followed by consultations with the wider membership of the United Nations, with a view to declare 24 April — day of the conclusion of the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung (1955) — as the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.

New York, 26 September 2018

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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 116 (d)
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections: election of members of the Human Rights Council

Note verbale dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the President of the General Assembly and has the honour to recall the decision of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to present its candidature to the Human Rights Council for the period 2019–2021 for the elections to be held during the seventy-third session of the Assembly.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/251, the Permanent Mission has the honour to present herewith the voluntary pledges and commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in support of its candidature (see annex). The Permanent Mission would be grateful if you could circulate the present note verbale and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 116 (d).

18-16457 (E) 091018

Please recycle

Annex to the note verbale dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Candidature of the Philippines to the Human Rights Council, 2019–2021

Voluntary pledges and commitments pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

I. Aide memoire for the candidature of the Republic of the Philippines to the Human Rights Council

1. The Philippines presents its candidature for a fifth term at the Human Rights Council since its establishment in 2006. The decision to seek a new term is based on its faith in fundamental human rights and the country's support for the inclusive work of the Council in the fulfilment of human rights of all peoples.

2. The Philippines reaffirms its belief that, amid the changes and challenges happening around the world, every human being can always find recourse in the constancy of human rights and mankind's unwavering efforts to realize them.

II. Strong tradition in the Philippines of human rights and advocacy of human rights at the regional and global levels

3. The Government of the Philippines attaches the utmost importance to the promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights. Its strong legal and cultural tradition in upholding human rights is enshrined in the Constitution. Human rights principles have underpinned the development of its laws and policies.

4. Under the Constitution of the Philippines, it is a State policy to value the dignity of every human person and to guarantee the full respect of human rights. The Constitution includes a bill of rights that protects civil and political rights and a standalone article on social justice and human rights that comprises economic, social and cultural rights.

5. The Philippines has an independent Commission on Human Rights, the country's national human rights institution. The country provides a vibrant environment for its citizens to fully enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and for human rights defenders and civil society to participate meaningfully in nation-building.

6. In the executive branch of the Government, the Presidential Human Rights Committee under the Office of the President coordinates the implementation of international human rights treaty obligations and national policies and programmes on human rights. In Congress, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have active human rights committees, which also act as oversight legislative bodies for the implementation of human rights obligations of the Government of the Philippines.

7. The Philippines is one of the original signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It made a lasting contribution to the drafting of the Declaration, particularly on articles on the equal dignity and freedom of all human beings and non-discrimination. It will continue to promote and respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation document for human rights.

8. The Philippines is a State party to eight core international human rights conventions and six optional protocols.

9. The Philippines is an original member of the Human Rights Council.[1] It currently serves as one of the Vice Presidents of the Human Rights Council Bureau representing the Asia Pacific group.

10. The Philippines believes that the Human Rights Council should be a partner of States and stakeholders in the promotion and protection of human rights by providing a venue for genuine constructive dialogue. Its strong focus on capacity-building, technical assistance and international cooperation on human rights must be further enhanced.

III. Achievements of the Philippines in the field of human rights

11. The Philippines is recognized globally for its leading position in the Global Gender Gap Index and in the Migration Governance Index.

12. The Government has enacted landmark legislation and programmes to further promote, protect and fulfil human rights and reinforce its domestic legal framework and has supported actively the global agenda on human rights issues, through the items below.

Family, women children and young people

- The Magna Carta of Women, RA 9710 (2009) establishes the commitment of the Government of the Philippines to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
- The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, RA 10354 (2012) provides for universal access to reproductive health-care services
- The Children's Emergency Relief and Protection Act, RA 10821 (May 2016), provides support for children and pregnant and lactating mothers in emergency situations for recovery and protection against all forms of exploitation and acts prejudicial to their interest, survival, development and well-being
- The Government has established 1,918 women and children helpdesks operated by 4,573 personnel in police stations nationwide (as of 2017)
- Administrative Order 2013*0011 enhances the policy on women and children protection units in all government hospitals
- The Foster Care Act, RA 10165 (2012), established a foster care programme to facilitate the return and reintegration or placement with an adoptive family
- The Cybercrime Prevention Act, RA 10175 (2012), aimed to prevent and combat crime by facilitating detection, investigation and prosecution
- The Domestic Workers Act, RA 10361 (2013), in pursuance of the International Labour Organization (ILO) decent work agenda, establishes standards, social protections and policies against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation and the performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and mental health; ensures safe end healthful working conditions; and promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes affecting the local domestic work

[1] During the first year of the establishment of the Council, the Philippines facilitated negotiations on the methods of work and rules of procedure, producing an important segment of the Council's institution-building package, as annexed to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1.

- The Anti-Bullying Act, RA 10627 (2013), requires all elementary and secondary schools to adopt policies to prevent and address the acts of bullying in their institutions
- The Strengthened Juvenile Justice and Welfare Law, RA 10630 (2013), amends RA 9344 and establishes a comprehensive juvenile justice and welfare system; it creates the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Social Welfare and Development
- The Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act, RA 10586 (2013), penalizes the acts of driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs or other intoxicating substances
- The Act declaring November of every year as National Children's Month, RA 10661 (2015), commemorates the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The Act Providing for the Safety of Children Aboard Motorcycles, RA 10666 (2015), pursues a preventive approach to secure the safety of passengers, especially children, by regulating the operation of motorcycles along roads and highways

Persons with disabilities and older persons

- The Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2010, RA 9994 (2010), established community-based health and rehabilitation programmes for senior citizens in every political unit and mandatory health insurance coverage for all senior citizens
- The Magna Carta for Persons with Disabilities, RA 7277 (1991), and RA 10524 (2013) amending the same, further amended and expanded by RA 10754 (2016), which together provide for positions in government agencies for persons with disabilities and expand benefits and privileges, such as discounts on certain goods and services

Migration

- Leadership in platforms for dialogue and cooperation on migration governance at the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the Colombo Process and the Bali Process as well as the negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration
- Enhancement of government response to distressed Filipinos abroad by strengthening national mechanisms, such as the Assistance-to-Nationals Fund and the Legal Assistance Fund administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers; as chair of ASEAN in 2017 the Philippines led the establishment of a framework for cooperation to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers in the ASEAN region
- Establishment of the Overseas Filipino Bank, through Executive Order 44, to provide financial products and services tailored to the requirements of overseas Filipinos
- Advocates for universal access for social protections and health-care services for all, regardless of migration status, through bilateral, regional and global platforms, including IOM, ILO and the World Health Organization

- The Act Amending the RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, RA 10022 (2009), was enacted to further improve the standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. Among the new provisions in RA 10022 included: (a) commitments to the continuous monitoring of international conventions and to become a signatory to and to ratify those instruments that guarantee the protection to our migrant workers, and to endeavour to enter into bilateral agreements with countries hosting overseas Filipino workers (Sec. 1, Par. A); (b) the provision that free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance should not be denied to any person by reason of poverty and that it is imperative to institute an effective mechanism to ensure that the rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, whether regular/documented or irregular/undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded (Sec. 1, Par. E), in skills development and enhancement programmes; and (c) the State recognition of trade unions, workers associations, stakeholders and their similar entities as partners of the State in the protection of Filipino migrant workers and in the promotion of their welfare (Sec. 1, Par. H), among others

Human security

- The Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012, RA 10353 (2012), institutionalizes the right against enforced or involuntary disappearance under any circumstance, including political instability, threat of war, state of war or other public emergencies
- The Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013, RA 10368 (2013), provides for the reparation and recognition of victims of human rights violations during the martial law regime of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos
- The Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, RA 10364 (2013), implementing commitments under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
- The establishment of an inter-agency committee on extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, torture and other grave violations of the right to life, liberty and security of persons, which coordinates with concerned agencies to act on allegations of such violations (Administrative Order 35 (2012))
- The establishment of the Presidential Task Force on Media Security through Administrative Order 1 (2016) to investigate and prosecute media killings
- The establishment of the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (2016)

Education, health, social services and labour

- Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013, RA 10533, strengthens the curriculum of basic education; and alternative delivery modes of education to ensure children's access to education, implementing the commitment by UNESCO to education for all, further expanded in 2017 for both elementary and secondary education
- Signatory to all eight fundamental ILO Conventions, such as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).

- Social services include the Expanded Cash Transfer Programme to support access to education and health for over four million marginalized families
- The *Go Negosyo* (do business) Act, RA 10644 (2014), enhances the income potentials of poor individuals and families through micro, small and medium enterprises
- Policies and laws are under consideration to affirm workers' constitutional and statutory right to security of tenure
- The Mental Health Act, RA 11036 (2018), provides universal access to affordable mental health services for all
- PHP 1 billion has been invested for the *Libreng Gamot Para Sa Masa* (free medicines for the people) programme
- PHP 1 billion has been invested for the BANGUN anti-hunger and anti-malnutrition programme for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
- The Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion, as part of the comprehensive tax reform programme envisioned by the Government to correct deficiencies in the tax system to make for a fairer and efficient system and enable the poor to benefit more from government programmes and services
- Housing and resettlement assistance
- Milk-feeding programme
- Alternative Delivery Modes of education to ensure children's access to education
- The *Abot-Alam* (learning outreach) programme to reach to underserved communities
- Executive Order No. 2, on operationalizing in the executive branch the people's constitutional right to information and the State policies to full public disclosure and transparency in public service

Indigenous peoples

- The Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997, RA 8371, upholds diversity by creating a national commission for indigenous peoples, specifically mandated to protect and promote the interest and well-being of indigenous peoples with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions, and by mainstreaming the rights of indigenous peoples in all sectors
- The Philippine Indigenous People's Ethnography programme completed the titling of all remaining ancestral domains/lands, including a census on the indigenous population and their housing
- Twelve indigenous people's regional action plans and a national action plan have been introduced under the Philippine Indigenous People's Ethnography programme
- Programmes have been introduced to enhance indigenous peoples' access to education, health and other public services specifically for indigenous peoples living in mining areas and those affected by calamities

Environment and climate action

- Leadership in climate change discourse, such as through the Climate Vulnerable Forums and in the advocacy for a human rights-based approach to climate action

in the Paris Agreement, and for a high-ambition agenda to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels

- The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, RA 10121, among other provisions, ensures that disaster risk reduction and climate change measures are gender responsive, sensitive to indigenous knowledge systems and respectful of human rights
- Implementation of the Philippine Clean Air Act, RA 8749 (1999), and establishment of 31 water quality management facilities and 9,725 materials recovery facilities
- Establishment of the National Anti-Illegal Logging Task Force, created by Executive Order 23 (2011)
- Implementation of National Greening Programme, expanded by Executive Order 193 (2015), and augmented by the 2016–2028 Master Plan for Forestry Development
- Implementation of the Sustainable Coral Reef Management Programme (2013–2020) through Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 2013-12

Fully functional national human rights institution

- The Commission on Human Rights — an independent national human rights institution provided for by the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and established on 5 May 1987 by virtue of Executive Order No. 163 — is mandated to conduct investigations on human rights violations against marginalized and vulnerable sectors of the society, involving civil and political rights. The Commission complies fully with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) and upholds six fundamental characteristics: independence, pluralism, a broad mandate, transparency, accessibility and operational efficiency.

IV. Mainstreaming human rights in the national agenda

13. The Philippines is finalizing its new medium-term five-year National Human Rights Plan (2018–2023), which will continue to mainstream human rights in society. The Plan covers the courses of action of the Government of the Philippines in line with its commitments under the Constitution, domestic laws and international human rights treaties to which it is a State party. It was crafted in consultation with various government agencies and other stakeholders under the supervision of the Presidential Human Rights Committee, an inter-agency body chaired by the Office of the President.

14. The Philippines has mainstreamed human rights in the development of policies, plans and programmes through its national medium-term development plans, the Philippine Development Plans and its long-term development plan, *AmBisyon Natin 2040* ("Our Vision 2040"), which is the blueprint of the Government's economic and social growth agenda that is fully aligned with Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The blueprint aims to transform the Philippines as an upper-middle income country and improve the lives and welfare of Filipinos. The Plans incorporate human rights as a cross-cutting agenda and the human rights-based approach to development remains as one of their main guiding principles.

15. The Philippines has continued to prioritize the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights through its continued efforts to eradicate extreme poverty and the strengthening of good governance, with the focused implementation of anti-corruption measures.

16. Based on a development policy framework focused on improving transparency and accountability in governance, improving access to quality social services, enhancing peace and security for development and ensuring ecological integrity, the Government of the Philippines is investing its resources in its people, aiming to improve their quality of life, empower the poor and marginalized and enhance social cohesion as a nation.

17. The Philippines welcomes consultations with civil society at both the national and international levels on human rights issues, especially in the formulation of relevant legislation, policies and programmes, and engages civil society partners in regional and international forums.

V. Contributions to international initiatives on the promotion and protection of human rights and support to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

18. As the main sponsor of General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions on combating trafficking in persons, especially women and children, the Philippines is engaged actively in pushing for stronger normative frameworks and better international collaboration to fight the scourge of trafficking in persons.

19. The Philippines also continues to work with partner countries to ensure that the issue of the adverse impact of climate change on the realization of human rights remains at the forefront of discussions at the Human Rights Council. The Philippines continues to be the lead core sponsor of the annual resolution of the Council on human rights and climate change.

20. The Philippines is also a member of the Platform on Human Rights Education and Training that co-sponsors the Human Rights Council resolutions on the implementation of the World Programme for Human Rights Education.

21. The Philippines is likewise a member of the core sponsors of the resolutions of the Human Rights Council on young people, extreme poverty and the role of parliamentarians in the universal periodic review.

22. Consistent with its belief that the protection of the human rights of the most vulnerable should remain the priority of the Human Rights Council, the Philippines consistently co-sponsors initiatives on issues involving the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants, children, women, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities and older persons.

23. Cognizant of its role in the international community and the protection of human rights of the most vulnerable, the Philippines takes pride in its efforts in implementing the Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, and its history of opening its doors to refugees and asylum seekers. The Philippines has an established system for refugee and stateless status determination, provides travel documents to recognized persons of concern and offers an emergency transit mechanism in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

24. The Philippines also supports the initiatives of OHCHR related to the protection of the human rights of migrants at international borders in its principles and guidelines on human rights for migrants in vulnerable situations.

VI. Pledges and commitments

25. If re-elected to the Human Rights Council, the Philippines reiterates its commitment:

(a) To work with all States and stakeholders in a constructive manner and foster dialogue and cooperation to make the Human Rights Council more efficient and effective as the primary body of the United Nations mandated to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights, and to address human rights violations;

(b) To continue to focus on bridging national, regional and international human rights goals, standards and strategies;

(c) To continue to enhance domestic implementation of all human rights treaty obligations and programmes, especially with regard to the eradication of extreme poverty, respect for the rule of law and fulfilment of internationally agreed development goals;

(d) To continue to be a voice for vulnerable groups, including migrants, women and children, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities and older persons, and support human rights-based approaches that address their concerns in a comprehensive, positive and practical way;

(e) To continue to be sensitive to current and emerging challenges that impact on human rights, such as climate change, human trafficking, terrorism and human mobility;

(f) To continue to engage actively with the human rights treaty bodies, special procedures and other mechanisms of the Human Rights Council;

(g) To continue to uphold the universality of the universal periodic review, recognizing its potential to effect real changes on the ground through constructive dialogue and international cooperation;

(h) To continue efforts to promote the efficiency of the Human Rights Council, wherein it currently has a leadership role as one of the Vice Presidents of the Human Rights Council Bureau, and the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations in Geneva serves as one of the co-facilitators. The contributions of the Philippines in this regard will hopefully result in a more streamlined and responsive Council able to fully serve its constituents and achieve the noble goal of promoting human rights for all;

(i) To continue to support the important work of national human rights institutions;

(j) To continue to engage in and promote meaningful interaction and cooperation with civil society organizations and other stakeholders on human rights issues, both at the national and international levels;

(k) To continue to promote international initiatives on human rights, such as those on climate change, migration, combating trafficking in persons, human rights education and training, protection of the rights of the child in migration, refugee and other contexts of vulnerability and the realization of the right to development, and to work closely with and support the OHCHR in this regard;

(l) To remain actively engaged in regional human rights mechanisms and support efforts to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in the ASEAN region.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda items 97, 101 (b), (i) and (p), 102 (b) and 104

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

General and complete disarmament:
Nuclear disarmament
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
Reducing nuclear danger

Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

Letter dated 19 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the inflammatory statements by Benjamin Netanyahu, boasting about the nuclear weapons capability of the Israeli regime and threatening Iran with nuclear annihilation.

On Wednesday, 29 August 2018, Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking from the underground nuclear weapons development centre of this regime, Dimona, boasted about the contribution of "the Dimona project" to the security of Israel and how the establishment of that project and a massive acquisition of inhumane nuclear weapons have ensured the nuclear deterrent capability of Israel. In his speech, he then pointed to Iran and asserted that "on the military level, Israel will act with full force against Iran" and explicitly threatened Iran with nuclear aggression and annihilation.

Such an inflammatory statement against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, and poses a real threat to international peace and security and, if unaddressed, undermines the credibility of the Treaty.

18-16050 (E) 081018

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The Security Council, in its resolution 984 (1995), "recognizes further that, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any State may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council ... and recognizes also that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action", in accordance with the Charter.

In view of the above, the Security Council should fulfil its Charter-based responsibility as well as its commitment, under resolution 984 (1995), to strongly condemn the threat by the Israeli regime to use nuclear weapons against Iran, to compel Israel to abandon its illicit nuclear weapons and to urge it to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without delay and place all of its unwarranted nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is indisputable that such inhumane weapons in the hands of the Israeli regime, a regime with an unparalleled record of non-compliance with Security Council resolutions and a long, dark catalogue of crimes and atrocities, such as occupation, aggression, militarism, State terrorism and crimes against humanity, pose a uniquely grave threat to regional as well as international peace and security. Peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East while the massive Israeli nuclear arsenal continues to threaten the region and beyond.

Members of the United Nations should not condone or tolerate such nuclear blackmail in the twenty-first century and should take resolute action to ensure the total elimination of all nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a victim of weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical weapons in recent history, is firmly committed to pursuing the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, in words and deeds.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 97, 101 (b), (i) and (p), 102 (b) and 104, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/73/410

General Assembly

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Seventy-third session
Agenda item 55
Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

Report of the Secretary-General*

Summary

The present report, prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/86, provides an update on Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan. The report covers the period from 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018.

* The present report is submitted late owing to a delayed clearance process beyond the control of the drafting entity.

18-16598 (E) 121018

Please recycle

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/86, provides an update on the implementation of the resolution from 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. It is based on monitoring and other information-gathering activities conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and on information provided by other United Nations entities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and by non-governmental organizations. The report should be read in conjunction with recent related reports of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted to the General Assembly and to the Human Rights Council (A/72/564, A/72/565, A/HRC/37/38, A/HRC/37/42 and A/HRC/37/43). The quarterly updates of the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) concerning the same period[1] also provide relevant information.

2. During the period under review, Israeli settlement activities continued unabated in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with significant legal developments, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan. Conditions and acts contributing to a coercive environment, including demolitions, forced evictions and acts of settler violence, remained a serious concern. In the present report, the developments relating to settlement expansion and the coercive environment in the Jordan Valley in the West Bank in particular are examined, and issues relating to Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan are addressed.

II. Legal background

3. International human rights law and international humanitarian law are concurrently applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely, Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In particular, that includes the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which is binding upon Israel as an occupying Power. A detailed analysis of the legal framework applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan can be found in recent reports of the Secretary-General (A/HRC/34/38 and A/HRC/34/39).

III. Activities related to settlements

4. The reporting period witnessed an increase in settlement plan advancement and settler violence, while the announcement of tenders and the rate of construction starts declined. The demolition of Palestinian structures and eviction of Palestinians in Area C continued, although at a slower pace than in the previous reporting period. In May, the High Court of Justice of Israel approved the demolition of the Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar–Abu al-Helu, which is home to about 181 Palestinians.

A. Settlement expansion

5. The spike observed during the previous reporting period in the advancement of plans for settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, continued, although a decline in tender announcements and construction starts was observed. Some 5,800 housing units were advanced in Area C, compared with fewer than 4,000 units in the previous period, and plans for an additional 1,700 units reached the final stage of

[1] See https://unsco.unmissions.org/security-council-briefings-0.

approval, compared with 600 units during the previous period. In East Jerusalem, the District Planning Committee advanced plans for approximately 2,300 units, up from 1,500 during the previous reporting period. Tenders were issued for nearly 2,100 units in Area C settlements, compared with 2,800 during the previous period. No new tenders have been issued for housing units in East Jerusalem since July 2016. Official data on settlement construction starts in Area C indicate a decline compared with the previous reporting period.[2] In March 2018, construction began on a new industrial area near Qiryat Arba' settlement, on the outskirts of Hebron.[3]

6. During the reporting period, there were no legalizations of outposts or declarations of State land.[4] Shabtai's Farm outpost was established on around four acres of declared State land in the southern West Bank. According to media reports and the Israeli non-governmental organization (NGO) Ta'ayush, on 25 February settlers took over an empty military base near Aqaba in the northern Jordan Valley and turned it into an outpost. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported subsequent harassment of Palestinians by settlers in the area, triggering protests by Palestinian and Israeli activists, after which the settlers left the outpost on 1 March. In addition, in response to an attack by a Palestinian in the settlement of Hallamish that caused the deaths of three of its residents, several mobile homes were added to the settlement without authorization and two checkpoints were established by the Israeli Defense Forces, which reportedly occasionally restricted travel between Palestinian communities in the area.

B. Consolidation of settlements

7. On 31 August 2017, the Government of Israel issued military order No. 1789 establishing a "civil services administration" for settlements in the H2 zone in Hebron, further consolidating the settler presence in Hebron (A/HRC/37/43, para. 12).[5] On 21 March 2018, settlers vacated the parts of the Abu Rajab house, located in the H2 zone, that they had taken over in July 2017 (ibid., paras. 14 and 22) after the High Court of Justice ruled they were to leave the premises until the conclusion of the related legal proceedings. On 26 March, some 20 settler families took over al-Zaatari house in the H2 zone, whose ownership is disputed, with a case currently pending in the Israeli courts.[6]

8. Settler organizations continued to exert influence over developments in East Jerusalem. On 11 February 2018, the Government of Israel handed over to the Elad settler organization the operational responsibility for a section of the Davidson Center, a major archaeological site located at the foot of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, in East Jerusalem.[7] Plans to build a 784-metre cable car line approved by the Government in 2017 were advanced; the line is to connect West Jerusalem to the

[2] Data are available only for the period June 2017–March 2018 (1,249 units) and April 2016–March 2017 (2,758 units).

[3] Peace Now, "New, government-approved settlement founded near Hebron", 6 March 2018. Available at http://peacenow.org.il/en/new-government-approved-settlement-founded-near-hebron.

[4] In February 2018, the Government of Israel approved the plan for legalizing the outpost of Netiv Ha'avot; see www.pmo.gov.il/MediaCenter/SecretaryAnnouncements/Pages/gov_mes250218.aspx.

[5] On 2 July 2018, the High Court of Justice issued an order (*nisi*) requesting the State to justify why it had not cancelled the military order following the petition submitted by the Municipality of Hebron, the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee and the Waqf Administration (HCJ 358/18).

[6] Yotam Berger, "Israeli settlers occupy homes in Hebron claimed to be Palestinian", *Haaretz*, 27 March 2018. Available at www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-settlers-occupy-homes-in-hebron-claimed-to-be-palestinian-1.5954588.

[7] The decision is available at www.gov.il/he/Departments/publications/reports/gov_mes110218.

Old City through a number of settler-controlled attractions in Silwan (S/2018/614, para. 6). In East Jerusalem, tourism-related developments led by settler organizations have profoundly changed the shape and character of Palestinian neighbourhoods, creating further footholds for settlement expansion (A/HRC/37/43, paras. 41–42).

Legislative developments

9. On 2 January 2018, the Knesset adopted the proposed amendment to the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel pertaining to the modification of the boundaries of the Municipality of Jerusalem. Amendments require a supermajority of 80 votes in the Knesset for approving territorial concessions in Jerusalem to "a foreign entity", which would hamper any negotiations regarding the borders in the context of the Middle East peace process. Easing other future changes, the amendment lowers the threshold required for changing Jerusalem's municipal boundaries (ibid., paras. 10–11). In this regard, it is necessary to recall that, in paragraph 17 of its resolution 72/14, the General Assembly called upon Israel to cease "all unilateral actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, that are aimed at altering the character, status and demographic composition of the Territory, including the confiscation and de facto annexation of land".

10. On 12 February 2018, the Knesset adopted a law that applies the jurisdiction of the Council for Higher Education of Israel to Israeli settlers in the West Bank and retroactively recognizes higher education institutions in settlements previously recognized by the military authorities. On 28 May, a bill providing that petitions relating to the West Bank[8] will be referred to the Administrative Affairs Court of Jerusalem instead of the High Court of Justice passed the first reading in the Knesset.[9] The law would further limit access to justice for Palestinians[10] and, in extending the competence of an Israeli administrative court to the West Bank, would also constitute an additional step towards blurring the distinction between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[11]

11. In line with the directive promulgated by the Attorney General on 31 December 2017 at the request of the Minister of Justice of Israel, for all government-sponsored bills brought up for approval in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation their applicability to the settlements in the West Bank must be addressed. The Knesset legal adviser followed suit with guidance requiring all committees to discuss the applicability to Israeli settlements of any new bill being prepared for a vote. In May 2018, the Attorney General's Office rushed the process of applying a new amendment to the law on municipal elections so that the new provisions of the electoral law could be applied to settlements by military order within two weeks of their adoption.

Regularization of outposts

12. In February 2017, the Knesset adopted the so-called "Regularization Law", which allows for the retroactive legalization of outposts built on private Palestinian land and of approximately 3,000 additional housing units built illegally in existing settlements. A petition to the High Court of Justice was submitted by Palestinian

[8] The bill refers to petitions submitted by Palestinians and by settlers relating to freedom of information, planning and building, freedom of movement in the West Bank, and administrative orders.

[9] The Law was adopted on 17 July 2018.

[10] Access to justice for Palestinians will be limited in view of high court fees and less legal protection owing to the lack of legal expertise in terms of laws applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including international law.

[11] Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 (Hague Regulations), art. 43; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 64.

regional councils and human rights organizations,[12] and the Law remains unimplemented pending the ruling of the High Court of Justice on its legality. The Attorney General, while opposing the Law, stated that pre-existing laws already provided for the legalization of Israeli construction on private Palestinian land in the West Bank (A/HRC/37/43, paras. 16–17). In August 2017, in its preliminary response to the petition against the law in the High Court of Justice, the Government of Israel declared that establishing settlements in the West Bank was a natural right of Israeli citizens.[13]

13. On 15 February 2018, the committee on legalizing the issues of land ownership for the Jewish settlements in the West Bank[14] submitted its final report, which includes unprecedented recommendations intended to legalize thousands of unauthorized Israeli structures in the West Bank, including those built on privately owned Palestinian land.[15] Two recommendations are based on the Attorney General's controversial legal opinions in which he identified alternatives to the Regularization Law (A/HRC/37/43, para. 17). Additional recommendations of the Committee included stopping the work of the task force for the survey of State land boundaries, also known as the Blue Line task force, which examines the official boundaries of settlements to ensure that they include only State land. Although criticized as ineffective, the activities of the task force were intended to settle claims of irregularities and remedy violations of the rights of landowners whose lands had been seized unjustly (A/HRC/31/43, paras. 21–23, and A/71/355, para. 13).

C. Impact of settlements on human rights

Settlement-related violence

14. In the reporting period, 89 Palestinians were injured and three were killed by settlers in the West Bank; in one case, a Palestinian was killed in the context of an alleged stabbing attack. There were also 127 incidents of property damage, including the vandalizing of 5,782 fruit trees. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the number of incidents rose from the beginning of 2018, and the monthly average number of incidents reached its highest level since 2015, increasing by 54 and 150 per cent compared with 2017 and 2016, respectively. A large number of the settler attacks continued to occur in the Nablus area, representing approximately one third of the recorded incidents in the West Bank. Six Israelis were killed by Palestinians in the West Bank, compared with 13 killed in the previous reporting period, while 58 Israeli civilians were injured during the period under review.

15. Violence related to settlements remained a serious concern, be it in the form of attacks by settlers against the Palestinian population and property or clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attempts by settlers to enter and/or attack Palestinian

[12] The petition was submitted on 3 March 2017 by the human rights organizations Yesh Din, Peace Now and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, on behalf of 27 Palestinian local councils, 4 Palestinian landowners and 13 Israeli civil society organizations. An expanded panel of the High Court of Justice heard the petition on 3 June 2018. No decision has been given yet.

[13] The preliminary response of the Government submitted to the High Court of Justice on 21 August 2017 to the petition against the "Regularization Law" is available at https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files.yesh-din.org/חוק+ההסדרה/Govenment+response+to+regulation+law+petition.pdf.

[14] The committee was established as part of the government coalition agreements, and after a security cabinet decision on the matter.

[15] See www.haaretz.co.il/embeds/pdf_upload/2018/20180504-102258.pdf.

communities in the West Bank, resulting in clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces on several occasions, led to 348 Palestinians injured.

16. According to monitoring by OHCHR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the rural area of Tuwani in the southern West Bank saw a spike in settler violence and harassment during the reporting period, stemming from the Avigayil outpost and the Havat Ma'on settlement.[16] On 30 March 2018, two settlers on a quad bike, armed with a bucket of stones, attacked Palestinians and international NGO workers, harassing them and throwing stones. They intentionally hit a 21-year-old Palestinian man with the quad bike, breaking his leg. A complaint was filed with the police.[17]

17. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to protect the Palestinian population from all acts of violence, in all circumstances.[18] It has the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the Palestinian population (A/HRC/34/38, paras. 13, 36 and 37).

18. The increase in settler violence coincided with the demolition by the Israeli authorities of several outposts and illegal structures, including in Maoz Ester, Havat Ma'on, Geulat Zion and Rosh Yosef, in early 2018.[19] It remained common, as previously documented (A/72/564, paras. 20–22), for the Israeli security forces not to prevent settler attacks or to fail to react to attacks occurring in their presence. The repeated failure by the Israeli authorities to investigate cases of settler violence and to prosecute perpetrators[20] also discourages Palestinian victims of settler violence from filing complaints.[21] Of the 26 cases filed by Palestinian victims regarding offences committed by Israelis in the West Bank, opened in 2017 and monitored by the NGO Yesh Din, two cases led to an indictment. Half of the cases were closed on the grounds of "offender unknown" owing to a failure to locate and identify suspected offenders.[22] In March 2018, however, an Israeli court convicted an Israeli of membership in a terror organization for his participation in "price tag" attacks against Palestinians in 2015. He and two other Israeli perpetrators, who were either children or enlisted in the Israeli Defense Forces at the time, were sentenced to between 32 months and five years of imprisonment.[23]

Impact of settlements on Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer

19. According to monitoring carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in early 2018 a family from the H2 zone was forced to move to the H1 zone as a consequence of an increasingly coercive environment. The father, who wished to remain unidentified, reported that his family had been subject to repeated settler violence and harassment and that most aspects of their daily

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[16] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory, May 2018.

[17] According to monitoring carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

[18] Hague Regulations, arts. 43 and 46; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27.

[19] According to the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

[20] A/HRC/37/43, para. 23, A/71/355, para. 50, and A/HRC/34/38, para. 33.

[21] Yesh Din, "Data sheet, December 2017: law enforcement on Israeli civilians in the West Bank", 7 January 2018, p. 4.

[22] According to Yesh Din, data on file.

[23] Yotam Berger, "In first, settler who carried out 'price tag' attacks convicted of membership in terror group", *Haaretz*, 29 March 2018. Available at www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-settler-who-carried-out-price-tag-attack-convicted-of-terror-group-1.5959079.

life, including the prospect of marriage for their children, had become harder as a result of new checkpoints and other obstacles that had been imposed in the area since October 2017 (A/HRC/37/43, para. 13). The family was determined to stay despite the hardship, but according to their testimony, decided to move after their daughter was harassed by male Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint leading to the H2 zone. The relocation of the family cannot be considered voluntary given the coercive actions by the occupying Power that triggered their decision, and it therefore raises serious concerns about forcible transfer (see paras. 57–58 below). Other families in the area voiced similar concerns, referring to increasing coercive factors, including women being searched by male soldiers at checkpoints, and the impact on children.

20. OHCHR followed the eviction of the Shamasneh family in Shaykh Jarrah, in East Jerusalem, which led to their displacement. On 5 September 2017, they were evicted by order of a court that had accepted settlers' claims of pre-1948 ownership of the property (A/HRC/37/43, para. 43).[24] In October, the family of eight moved to Bayt Naqqubah, Israel, about 15 km from their original home. The family's involuntary move caused by its forced eviction and other coercive actions by the occupying Power raises strong concerns about forcible transfer (see paras. 57–58 below).

21. During the reporting period, Israel demolished 343 structures in the West Bank,[25] displacing 408 people, including 189 children, compared with the demolition of 719 structures during the previous reporting period, displacing 1,083 people, including 554 children. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, demolitions in the reporting period included 13 school-related structures, while 45 schools (37 in Area C and 8 in East Jerusalem) were under demolition or "stop work" orders as at 31 May 2018. After reaching a record high in 2016, demolition figures in Area C during the period under review were at their lowest point since the United Nations began recording them in 2009.

22. On 24 May 2018, the High Court of Justice approved the demolition of the Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar–Abu al-Helu, including its school (A/HRC/37/43, para. 25, and A/69/348, paras. 12–16). At the time of writing, the 181 Palestinian residents of the village were facing the possibility of imminent forcible transfer. That decision represents a significant negative precedent for other Bedouin communities in the area. In September 2017, the Minister of Defence of Israel announced that plans to demolish structures in the community of Suseya were proceeding (A/HRC/37/43, para. 25). On 1 February 2018, the High Court of Justice rendered a decision allowing the immediate demolition of seven structures in that community.[26]

23. On 2 May 2018, the Israeli Civil Administration carried out several demolitions and confiscations owing to a lack of Israeli construction permits in the Markaz, Halawah, Fakhiet and Jinba communities, located in a firing zone in Masafer Yatta. Ten residential structures, three animal pens and three water systems were demolished, and five solar energy systems were confiscated. Thirty-five Palestinians, including eight children, were left homeless as a result of the demolitions.[27] The

[24] The combination of three laws enacted by Israel since 1948 allows Jews to claim ownership rights to properties on the basis of alleged pre-1948 Jewish ownership. Palestinians who owned land or property in areas before 1948 that are now part of the State of Israel are not, however, granted any reciprocal right (A/HRC/37/43, para. 40).

[25] Of those structures, 131 were located in East Jerusalem.

[26] Haqel, "High Court decision: 7 structures in the village of Susya will be demolished with immediate effect", 1 February 2018. Available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54231cc6e4b0d46e9dc0c8c1/t/5a75022eec212dda58e42b08/1517617711401/High+Court+Decision+February+1st+2018.pdf.

[27] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights monitoring data; A/HRC/34/39, para. 44.

confiscation of means of producing electricity also affected the ability to refrigerate foodstuffs produced by the community, which are their main source of livelihood.

24. On 17 April 2018, the Israeli authorities issued a military order for the removal of new structures built without permits in Area C,[28] giving the Israeli Civil Administration the power to demolish (within 96 hours) any structure within six months of its construction, including any residential building that has not been inhabited or has been inhabited for less than 30 days.

25. Such demolitions and forced evictions entail numerous human rights violations (A/HRC/37/43, para. 3), exacerbate the coercive environment and raise concerns about the risk of forcible transfer. They also raise concerns about compliance with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law that are binding on an occupying Power, including the prohibitions on the destruction of property and of institutions dedicated to education.[29]

IV. Impact of settlements: a case study of the coercive environment in the Jordan Valley

26. The Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea areas represent approximately 30 per cent of the West Bank and are inhabited by around 64,000 Palestinians and some 8,000 Israeli settlers.[30] The vast and fertile land of the Jordan Valley is largely inaccessible to the Palestinian population; Israeli settlements have direct control of some 15 per cent of the area, and approximately 21 per cent of the Valley has been declared as "nature reserves" in past decades, prohibiting by military order any use of the land. Furthermore, the Israeli army has declared approximately 56 per cent of the Valley to be "closed military zones", mostly for military training purposes (known as "firing zones"). Palestinians are prohibited from gaining access to closed military areas unless they were living there before the closure. Together, the closed military zones, nature reserves and the land allocated to settlements have rendered 78.3 per cent of the Jordan Valley off limits to its Palestinian inhabitants.[31]

27. The situation leads to a range of possible human rights violations and severely limits the potential for Palestinian economic development.[32] In Area C in the Jordan Valley, which covers 90 per cent of the region, approximately 10,000 Palestinians live in more than 50 Bedouin or herding communities.[33] They are considered some of the most vulnerable communities in the West Bank, with limited access to education,

[28] The military order related to the removal of new buildings (No. 1797-2018) entered into effect on 16 June 2018 for a temporary period of two years, with a possibility of extension. Several organizations submitted petitions against the order to the High Court of Justice. In response to the petitioners' motion for a temporary order to freeze the implementation of the military order, on 19 June 2018 the State Attorney's Office notified the Court that the order would be temporarily frozen until the Court gave its decision.

[29] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 53; Hague Regulations, art. 56 (as noted in A/HRC/34/38, paras. 21 and 33).

[30] Peace Now, "The Jordan Valley", 2017. Available at http://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/JordanValleyEng.pdf.

[31] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update", Special Focus, August 2011. Available at www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_movement_and_access_report_august_2011_english.pdf.

[32] Leila Farsakh, "From domination to destruction: the Palestinian economy under the Israeli occupation", in Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi, *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Brooklyn, New York, Zone Books, 2009), pp. 389–390.

[33] See www.btselem.org/jordan_valley.

health services, water, sanitation and electricity. They are also at significant risk of forcible transfer owing to coercive factors.[34]

28. The Bedouin or herding communities residing in firing zones face additional vulnerabilities, with high levels of humanitarian need.[35] In the absence of active hostilities, firing zones mainly serve the purpose of military training and hence do not appear to meet the threshold of imperative military reasons or absolute necessity for military operations that may justify any evacuation of the population or destruction of property, respectively,[36] as demonstrated by the fact that land has been transferred from firing zones to settlements (A/72/564, para. 47).

29. In October 2017, the Prime Minister of Israel stated that "the Jordan Valley will always remain a part of Israel".[37] Constituting nearly 30 per cent of the West Bank, the Jordan Valley contains less than 2 per cent of the settler population and accounts for a small share of the advancement of plans for housing units in settlements. In November 2017, the Minister of Construction declared the intention of the Government to "strengthen the Jordan Valley and double the size of existing settlements", increasing benefits for Israelis settling in the Jordan Valley.[38] In February 2018, a subcommittee of the Israeli Civil Administration advanced plans to create a tourist site with 120 hotel rooms and various activities in a new compound near the Palestinian village of Fasa'il and the Petza'el settlement.[39] Combined with the construction of a race track in a firing zone near the settlement in early 2017, those plans can be seen as an effort to boost Israeli tourism in the area.[40]

30. Besides State-sanctioned settlements, outposts are exacerbating tensions with nearby Palestinian communities, especially in the northern Jordan Valley (see paras. 39–43 below), where six outposts have been established on Palestinian land,[41] including three since October 2016. In February 2018, settlers temporarily set up an outpost on an abandoned army base (see para. 6 above).

A. Discriminatory planning and zoning

31. As most of the Jordan Valley is located in Area C, the possibilities are severely limited for Palestinians to register land and obtain construction permits and local

[34] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Four herding communities in the Northern Jordan Valley at imminent risk of forcible transfer", Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory, October 2017. Available at www.ochaopt.org/content/four-herding-communities-northern-jordan-valley-imminent-risk-forcible-transfer.

[35] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Firing zones and risk of forcible transfer", Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory, special ed., May–June 2017. Available at www.ochaopt.org/content/firing-zones-and-risk-forcible-transfer.

[36] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 49 (2) and 53.

[37] Yotam Berger, "Netanyahu calls region 'strategic defensive belt for the country' in the ceremony marking 50 years of Israeli settlement in Jordan Valley", *Haaretz*, 19 October 2017. Available at www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.818231.

[38] David Israel, "Housing Minister: Israel to double Jordan Valley settlements", Jewish Press, 9 November 2017. Available at www.jewishpress.com/news/eye-on-palestine/housing-minister-israel-to-double-jordan-valley-settlements/2017/11/09/.

[39] Peace Now, "The Higher Planning Committee approved three new settlement areas today", 12 February 2018. Available at http://peacenow.org.il/en/higher-planning-committee-approved-three-new-settlement-areas-today.

[40] Edo Konrad, "Settlers building race track inside IDF live-fire training zone", +972 Magazine, 27 February 2017. Available at https://972mag.com/settlers-building-race-track-inside-idf-live-fire-training-zone/125476/.

[41] On land belonging to the villages of al-Aqabah, Hamam al-Malih, Umm al-Jamal, Ein al Hilweh, Tall al-Himmah, Khirbat Samarah and al-Farisiyah.

outline plans.[42] To build legally in Area C, a local outline plan for the area must have been approved by the Israeli authorities, after which a permit must be requested through a lengthy and costly process that often results in rejection (A/72/564, paras. 25 and 35).[43] To enhance the ability of Palestinians to obtain building permits, Palestinian and international stakeholders have since 2011 prepared and submitted to the Israeli Civil Administration 102 local outline plans for communities in the entirety of Area C. However, only five plans have been approved by the Administration, and none of the 11 plans submitted in the Jordan Valley have been approved.[44] For example, Jiftlik, one of the largest communities in the Jordan Valley, with a population of about 5,000, faces problems accommodating the natural increase of its population in the absence of approved master plans. A planning proposal was submitted to the Israeli Civil Administration in 2013 but has since remained pending. Construction without permits in Area C entails a high risk of demolition (see paras. 33–38 below). Currently, Jiftlik faces 217 standing demolition orders for unpermitted construction.[45]

32. As noted previously, the Israeli zoning and planning policy in Area C and East Jerusalem is discriminatory and considered incompatible with requirements under international law, and building permits are almost impossible to obtain (A/HRC/34/38, para. 26). Palestinians have no choice but to build without permits and to expose themselves to the risk of demolitions, which represents a significant coercive environment factor.

B. Home demolitions and forced evictions or the threat thereof

33. The restrictive building permit regime in Area C and East Jerusalem makes it almost impossible for Palestinians to accommodate increases in family size (A/HRC/37/43, para. 31). OHCHR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs monitored the case of four houses that were demolished in Jiftlik Ash Shunah (Area C) on 7 November 2017, affecting 20 Palestinians. The houses had been built without Israeli permits. One young mother described how her home had been built to house a new family with three small children. The destruction of the fully furnished home meant that years of savings and construction were lost, and the family was forced to move back to the husband's parents' house.

34. The implementation of the Israeli planning regime is of concern with regard to the right to adequate standards of living, including the right to housing and the prohibition on forced evictions, as well as the prohibition on unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home (A/HRC/34/38, para. 26). The impediments to accommodating new and expanding families affect young people in particular and may deter marriages or force them to leave.

35. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, thousands of Palestinian residents in Area C in the Jordan Valley face the risk of home demolition. In October 2017, the High Court of Justice allowed the demolition of more than 200 structures in the Palestinian communities of Makhul, Humsat al-Buqay'ah, al-Farisiyah-Ihmayyer and al-Farisiya-Nabe al-Ghazal, putting an

[42] United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), *Spatial Planning in Area C of the Israeli Occupied West Bank of the Palestinian Territory*, May 2015, p. 17; A/72/564, para. 33; A/68/513, para. 32.

[43] The average approval rate for applications for building permits by Palestinians in Area C between 2007 and 2016 was less than 4 per cent. See United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Four herding communities in the northern Jordan Valley".

[44] UN-Habitat, *Spatial Planning in Area C of the Israeli Occupied West Bank of the Palestinian Territory*.

[45] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

estimated 171 people, more than 50 per cent of whom are children, at imminent risk of displacement. Many of the four communities have already faced demolitions and consequent displacement. Since 2013, several demolitions in Makhul have resulted in the departure of 5 out of 10 families (21 out of 50 persons) to other parts of the West Bank.[46]

36. During the reporting period, 54 structures were demolished or confiscated in the Jordan Valley, displacing 42 people, including 21 children.[47] This marks a decline compared with the previous reporting period, which saw the demolition of 262 structures, displacing 276 people, including 114 children. Demolitions generally have a severe impact on women, as they are often the primary caregivers for extended families and manage household livelihoods (A/HRC/37/43, para. 44). The Secretary-General has reported on the disproportionate impact of demolitions on the rights of women and girls to privacy and health (A/72/564, paras. 52–53).

37. More generally, the losses caused by demolitions and forced evictions of the Bedouin and herder communities have had an impact on livelihoods and resulted in increased expenditures for affected families, including when they were not allowed to take their possessions before the demolition (A/72/564, para. 57).

38. Demolitions or the threat thereof are at the heart of numerous possible violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law (see para. 25 above) and are a major factor contributing to the creation of a coercive environment that might force people to leave.[48]

C. Freedom of movement

39. The confiscation of areas for settlements and outposts and the designation of lands as military zones and nature reserves, combined with settler harassment, have had a devastating impact on the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley.

40. OHCHR monitored the impact on the Palestinian herder community of Khirbat Tall al-Himmah in the northern Jordan Valley. Located in Area C between Mehola settlement and the Giv'at Sal'it outpost, the community has experienced increased settler violence and demolition threats[49] since the establishment of the outpost Shirat Ha'asabim, on private Palestinian land, 200 metres away from the village, in September 2016. The residents reported how they had been harassed since by settlers, especially the herders grazing sheep. They highlighted incidents of threats and harassment, including the targeting of flocks and of settlers physically preventing them from gaining access to the only grazing area that the community has relied on for the past 40 years. The situation resulted in a significant economic loss for the community, as herders needed to buy more animal fodder or rent nearby Palestinian land to keep their livestock. Since 2009, the village of about 100 people has been exposed to the demolition and/or confiscation of 44 community structures that used to house 64 people, including 25 children.[50]

[46] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Four herding communities in the northern Jordan Valley".

[47] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

[48] A/72/564, paras. 37–58, A/HRC/25/38, paras. 11–20, A/HRC/31/43, paras. 44 and 46, A/HRC/28/80, para. 24, and A/69/348, para. 13.

[49] According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there have been four cases of demolition or confiscation since September 2016.

[50] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central Field Coordination Unit, case note 2017 (on file with the Secretariat).

41. In December 2016, settlers established the outpost of Umm Zuqah on private Palestinian land that had been declared a nature reserve. The nearby herding community of Khirbat Samarah reported that settlers from the outpost threatened the herders and chased their animals on a daily basis. The herders were no longer able to graze their sheep without the protective presence of organizations, including the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel of the World Council of Churches[51] and Ta'ayush. Five families have left the community over the past 10 years owing to repeated demolitions and increased restrictions to their grazing area — private Palestinian lands that had been declared a nature reserve and on which the outpost was later built. According to the community members, settlers from the outpost have been harassing children waiting for the school bus. The continuous harassment and intimidation of the community and other impediments, including in access to education, led the community to send children over the age of 11 to Tubas, 50 km away, where they live apart from their families.

42. The communities of Khirbat Tall al-Himmah and Khirbat Samarah reported similar behaviour from settlers, who have been threatening shepherds with sticks and firearms to prevent them from gaining access to land and have been using quad bikes, horses, dogs or cars to chase, disturb and disperse the sheep. All the shepherds interviewed by OHCHR reported that such behaviour caused stress to the sheep, sometimes leading to miscarriage. According to the communities, the Israeli security forces are not present at the majority of incidents of settler harassment or attacks. When they are, they reportedly do not intervene to protect the Palestinians.

43. The shepherds and organizations that provide them with a protective presence, such as the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel and Ta'ayush, reported that settlers called the Israel Defense Forces to enforce movement restrictions in the military zones and nature reserve areas, which represent 64 per cent of the Jordan Valley,[52] impeding access for Palestinian herders, while not enforcing such restrictions on settlers who grazed livestock or established outposts in such areas. Such impediments have an impact on food resources and related revenue and may force Bedouin and herding communities to leave, as herding is their only source of income.

D. Rights to life, liberty and security of person

44. In the Jordan Valley, as in other parts of Area C in the West Bank, communities located inside or in areas surrounding firing zones have been continuously impacted by military training, including live fire (A/HRC/34/39, para. 52, and A/72/564, para. 41).

45. In 2014, an Israeli colonel stated to a Knesset subcommittee that the Israeli military was using military firing zones in Area C to deter the building of Palestinian structures without permits.[53] According to the Israeli NGO B'Tselem, between March and July 2018 the Israel Defense Forces conducted military exercises near 14 Palestinian communities in the Jordan Valley with little or no forewarning almost on a daily basis.[54] B'Tselem reported that such exercises were carried out in increasing

[51] The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel reported accompanying herders from 42 different communities in the Jordan Valley to prevent settler harassment.

[52] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update".

[53] A/69/348, para. 15; the protocol of the Knesset subcommittee on foreign affairs and defence for the West Bank meeting, 27 April 2014. Available at www.haaretz.co.il/st/inter/Hheb/images/amira1.pdf.

[54] See www.btselem.org/video/20180501_humsah_temp_evacuation#full.

proximity to homes, using armoured vehicles, mortar shells and live ammunition, and using concrete blocks to block access to roads to communities.[55] During some exercises of the Israel Defense Forces, the Palestinian communities affected were temporarily forcibly relocated from their lands, sometimes without warning, preventing them from overseeing their property and livestock. On 5 February 2018, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the Israeli army had entered the herding community of al-Furisiya Ihmayyer with five tanks, without prior notification, destroying crops and firing shells near the community. Those incidents have traumatized the community, especially the children. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the community reported that a 4-month-old baby had to be hospitalized for a panic attack caused by the sound of shellfire.

46. Bedouin and herding communities are also affected by unexploded munitions left behind by the Israeli military. For instance, on 22 July 2017, a 16-year-old Palestinian boy in the herding community Khirbat Ibziq was killed after triggering an unexploded grenade while tending sheep. According to his father and the Palestinian authorities in Tubas, the family filed a complaint with the Israeli authorities in April 2018 and a formal compensation procedure was initiated.[56]

E. Access to services

47. While Area C communities are generally underserved, the distances in the Jordan Valley complicate access to services such as education and health care. More than a third (189 out of 532) of the residential areas in Area C lack a primary school.[57] As a result, some children are forced to travel long distances, sometimes on foot, to reach the nearest school. As there are no established public transportation lines in the Jordan Valley, communities pay for private transportation. Because of the distance to education facilities, the cost of transportation and incidents of settler harassment, some isolated communities have sent students to stay and study in nearby towns (see para. 41 above).[58] Access constraints are also a key factor behind the high school dropout rate and the decision of families to leave their communities, as reported among the remote Hadidiyah community.[59]

48. Israel connects settlements and unauthorized outposts in the West Bank with electricity and water grids, but it does not supply all Palestinian communities in Area C. Furthermore, the restrictive planning regime applied in Area C denies Palestinians the possibility of developing their own water infrastructure, for example by digging wells.[60]

49. Water is an important component for Jordan Valley communities because of the hot climate and their reliance on agriculture and herding. However, around 10,000 Palestinians in more than 50 communities in the Jordan Valley are not connected to

[55] See www.btselem.org/video/20180302_tanks_on_your_doorstep#full.

[56] According to monitoring carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

[57] Data from 2013 survey; see United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Access to education in Area C of the West Bank", Humanitarian Bulletin, Occupied Palestinian Territory, special ed., May–June 2017. Available at www.ochaopt.org/content/access-education-area-c-west-bank.

[58] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Jordan Valley case study: focus on the impact of closures in Buqay'ah Valley", 2011 (on file with the Secretariat).

[59] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Access to education in Area C of the West Bank".

[60] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update".

the water network, and half of their expenditure is devoted to buying tanked water.[61] Because of the distance to the filling points, which can be up to 27 km,[62] and the high transportation costs, residents not connected to the water network pay up to five times the price for water compared with those who are connected. Such high prices incurred by communities that are already widely affected by poverty have resulted in an extremely low consumption of water, estimated at less than 30 litres per person per day for all purposes, including livestock.[63] The World Health Organization recommends 100 litres per person per day as the minimum to meet all domestic needs. Their limited access to water has contributed to a further depletion of the financial resources of the communities, a decline in the health and productivity of their livestock and a degradation of hygiene.[64]

50. On 9 November 2017, near the Ein al Beida community in the northern Jordan Valley, settlers destroyed with a bulldozer around 650 metres of water pipes from an irrigation network. The pipes had been installed as part of a donor-funded humanitarian project to support farmers in the area who had regained access to their private land following a ruling of the High Court of Justice.[65]

51. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 22.5 per cent of the population (1.32 million people) is food insecure.[66] According to a 2016–2017 survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), more than 60 per cent of the Bedouin and herding communities living in Area C were food insecure, compared with 50 per cent reported in a 2012 survey.[67]

52. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported strong links between the high levels of food insecurity and the access restrictions imposed on Bedouin communities in the Jordan Valley. Restricted movement has an impact on livestock productivity and access to food items from nearby towns.[68] In cases of demolition, especially in remote areas such as the Jordan Valley, food supplies and livestock may be lost or livestock structures damaged. That usually places a further burden on women, who bear the primary responsibility for securing food supplies.[69]

F. Other factors prompting displacement

53. The violations described above, including violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, may cause residents of the Jordan Valley, especially herders and Bedouins, to leave their usual places of residence.

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Gruppo di Volontariato Civile and Action Against Hunger, "Water master plan for the south and north-east communities of the West Bank", 2017, p. 40 (on file with the Secretariat).

[63] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update", p. 26. See also www.btselem.org/jordan_valley.

[64] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update".

[65] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Protection of civilians: biweekly highlights, 24 October–6 September 2017". Available at www.ochaopt.org/content/protection-civilians-report-24-october-6-november-2017.

[66] World Food Programme (WFP), "Food insecurity in Palestine", 2016 (on file with the Secretariat).

[67] WFP, "Food insecurity is on the rise amongst Bedouins and herders in Area C" (on file with the Secretariat).

[68] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "West Bank movement and access update".

[69] Suha Jarrar, *Unpacking Gender in Coercive Environments: The Case of the Jordan Valley* (Ramallah, Al-Haq, 2017), p. 12.

54. According to the 2016–2017 survey conducted by WFP and UNRWA, a majority of the nearly 500 herder and Bedouin households in the West Bank had experienced relocations as a result of eviction orders (39 per cent), home demolitions (22 per cent), violence and harassment perpetrated by settlers and the Israeli security forces (17 per cent), restrictions of access to services or natural resources (9.8 per cent), the wall (2.4 per cent) and the destruction of irrigation systems and confiscation of agricultural land (2.4 per cent), among other reasons.[70] Many communities have consequently been displaced repeatedly from one location to another within Area C.

55. OHCHR monitored a case of settler violence that caused the displacement of a herder community of 17 people, all of them Palestinian refugees, from the place in which they had resided for the previous 40 years, on the outskirts of Mu'arrajat, north-west of Jericho — a very isolated location between the Rimonim, Yitav and Kokhav HaShahar settlements. On 22 January 2018, settlers attacked herders, including a woman, with sticks near their community. They injured an 18-year-old in the head, causing internal bleeding. Israeli authorities arrived at the site after the attack and launched an investigation which was still ongoing as at 31 May 2018. After the attack, community members reported fears of other attacks and were especially worried about the safety of the children. The community first relocated 1 km away, on 8 February 2018, but as the location was not suitable for livestock, they relocated again on 6 April to land outside of Sinjil, approximately 17 km from their usual centre of life. The new location is near a main road, which increases vulnerability to harassment by settlers or the Israeli security forces. The new site also offers less protection during winter compared with the previous site.

56. OHCHR also monitored the displacement of a family from the northern Jordan Valley to Najadah, the southernmost point in the West Bank. The family depends on herding and told OHCHR that it had moved from Najadah to the Jordan Valley 18 years ago owing to drought. They had lived in four different places in the Jordan Valley as a result of continuous demolitions and harassment by the Israeli authorities. In the latest location, Malih al-Meiteh, an entire community of 16 families had received demolition orders in 2014 owing to the creation of a closed military zone, to which the community objected. Related legal proceedings before the High Court of Justice were still ongoing at the time of writing. Nevertheless, the family reported increased pressure from the Israeli military through frequent night raids and searches, as well as military exercises that forced the community to relocate temporarily. Malih al-Meiteh is one of the most vulnerable communities in the West Bank owing to the restrictions imposed on the people's daily lives and livelihoods, including demolitions, which have increased their level of poverty and dependence on aid.[71] The family decided to leave for Najadah because of the increased pressure, demolition threats and security concerns for themselves and their livestock as a result of the frequent military exercises, including live fire and tank shells.[72] The family said they would not hesitate to go back to the Jordan Valley if they could live without fear of harassment and demolition, even temporarily. In addition to the families who have already left, the remaining members of the community are considered to be at high risk of forcible transfer.

Impact of a coercive environment

57. The Secretary-General has previously voiced concerns about the impact of settlement policies on the living conditions of Palestinians, including their increased risk of forcible transfer (A/HRC/34/39, para. 40). The Israeli authorities are

[70] WFP, "Food insecurity is on the rise amongst Bedouins and herders in Area C".

[71] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central West Bank Field Coordination Unit, briefing paper, May 2018 (on file with the Secretariat).

[72] Including the risk of accidents arising from unexploded ordnance, as reported in para. 46.

increasing pressure on Palestinians living in areas under their full control, creating conditions that contribute to a coercive environment, which may compel them to move out of their areas of residence (ibid., paras. 40–42).

58. International humanitarian law prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, regardless of the motive.[73] Such a transfer amounts to a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and a war crime that may lead to individual criminal responsibility.[74] Forcible transfer does not necessarily require the use of physical force by authorities; it may be triggered by specific factors creating a coercive environment that compels individuals or communities to leave. Any transfer without the genuine and fully informed consent of those affected is considered forcible (A/HRC/34/38, para. 28, and A/HRC/34/39, para. 41). Besides highlighting multiple human rights violations in a situation of forcible transfer (A/HRC/37/43, para. 28), the cases described below illustrate how the mere existence of a coercive environment affects the enjoyment of human rights.

V. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

59. Illegal settlement expansion and land appropriation by the Government of Israel in the occupied Syrian Golan continued during the reporting period, in violation of the obligations of Israel under international law. The Secretary-General reaffirms the continuing validity of Security Council resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was null and void and without international legal effect (A/71/355, para. 66).

60. The 34 illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan are home to an estimated 23,000 Israeli settlers and are supported by the Government of Israel through financial incentives. The settlements also benefit from a disproportionately large allocation of natural resources, such as clean water, compared with Syrian residents (A/HRC/28/44, para. 54, and A/HRC/31/43, para. 64). During the reporting period, concerns regarding the situation in the occupied Syrian Golan persisted, with Syrian residents of the Golan facing ongoing problems owing to the discriminatory land, housing and development policies established by the Israeli authorities, who control 95 per cent of the land in the occupied Syrian Golan.[75] Those policies continue to make it nearly impossible for Syrians to obtain building permits, leading to increasingly overcrowded villages and limited opportunities for development (A/72/564, paras. 60–61). Further concerns have been raised about the impact of those policies on access to livelihoods, in particular agriculture.[76] Human rights organizations have also consistently raised concerns about the presence of land mines in the occupied Syrian Golan.[77]

61. In January 2018, the Interior Minister of Israel announced that municipal elections would be held in the occupied Syrian Golan in October 2018. Those will be

[73] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49. A limited exception appears in the second paragraph of the article cited.

[74] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (viii).

[75] International Labour Organization (ILO), *The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories*, ILC.107/DG/APP (Geneva, 2018), para. 147.

[76] ILO, *The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories*, paras. 149–150.

[77] Adalah, "Adalah, Al-Marsad demand Israel remove army outposts and minefields from occupied Syrian town on Golan Heights", 2 August 2017. Available at www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9180.

the first elections held there since the occupation began.[78] Only those who hold Israeli citizenship are eligible for election, raising concerns about discrimination. Many Syrian residents of the occupied territory have announced that they will boycott the elections. Residents report that Israel is increasing pressure on Syrians to accept Israeli citizenship, which only an estimated 10 per cent of the Syrian population has done at this stage.[79] Those who do not accept Israeli citizenship are reportedly given only permanent resident status.[80] The International Labour Organization has noted that the intensified efforts to fully integrate the occupied Syrian Golan into Israel are contributing to the creation of a threat to Syrian identity in the occupied Syrian Golan.[81]

62. In May 2018, the Intelligence Minister of Israel told Reuters in an interview that his Government was expecting the United States to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan in the coming months.[82]

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

63. **The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law.**[83]

64. **The exacerbation of a coercive environment has had a highly detrimental impact on the human rights of Palestinians. A significant increase in settler violence was witnessed during the reporting period. In Hebron, Area C and East Jerusalem, several factors led to a deterioration in living conditions. The advancement of plans for further housing units in settlements continued to increase, while the number of tenders and rate of construction starts decreased. After a record high in 2016, demolition figures in Area C reached a low in the reporting period.**

65. **Palestinians remained subject to a restrictive planning, permit and construction regime, placing many of them under the threat of demolition orders and displacement, and with highly limited public services and access to land, which is also impeded by incidents of settler harassment and the behaviour of the Israeli security forces. Those factors violate multiple fundamental human rights and contribute to a coercive environment in the Jordan Valley and other areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.**

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[78] Middle East Monitor, "Israel to hold elections in occupied Golan Heights", 9 January 2018. Available at www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180109-israel-to-hold-local-elections-in-occupied-golan-heights/.

[79] Nour Samaha, "Syrians in Golan Heights to boycott municipal election by Israel", Al-Jazeera, 21 June 2018. Available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/syrians-golan-heights-boycott-israel-election-area-180619180932900.html; ILO, *The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories*, para. 148.

[80] Al-Marsad, "Election in Syrian villages in occupied Golan", 11 February 2018. Available at http://golan-marsad.org/elections-in-syrian-villages-in-occupied-golan/.

[81] ILO, *The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories*, para. 151.

[82] Dan Williams, "Exclusive: Israel minister says U.S. may soon recognize Israel's hold on Golan", 23 May 2018. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel-usa-exclu/exclusive-israeli-minister-says-us-may-soon-recognize-israels-hold-on-golan-idUSKCN1IO2YU.

[83] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49, sixth paragraph.

66. **Further numbers of Palestinians living in Area C and the H2 zone of Hebron were compelled to leave, as previously documented,[84] in violation of the prohibition of forcible transfers under international humanitarian law.**

67. **On the basis of the present report, the Secretary-General recommends that Israel:**

(a) **Immediately halt and reverse all settlement development and related activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 2334 (2016);**

(b) **Immediately end all activities contributing to the creation of a coercive environment and/or leading to the risk of forcible transfer;**

(c) **Review planning laws and policies to ensure that they are compliant with the obligations of Israel under international human rights and humanitarian law;**

(d) **Cease taking any initiative to relocate communities in Area C, including Bedouin and herder communities, in contravention of international law;**

(e) **Take all steps necessary to ensure that Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Area C of the occupied West Bank are not denied access to the provision of essential services, including electricity, water and sanitation, and to natural resources, including land for agricultural purposes;**

(f) **Take all measures to ensure the protection of the Palestinians and their property in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, from settler violence;**

(g) **Ensure that settler violence against Palestinians and their property is investigated, that perpetrators are prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions, and that victims are provided with effective remedies, including adequate compensation, in accordance with international standards;**

(h) **Immediately halt and reverse all settlement development and related activities in the occupied Syrian Golan, and end discriminatory land, housing and development policies, in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions;**

(i) **Remove immediately all mines and minefields in the occupied Syrian Golan, which pose a risk to the local population.**

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[84] A/HRC/31/43, para. 60, and A/71/355, paras. 61–64.

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United Nations reform: measures and proposals

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019

Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: comparative assessment of human resources structures

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: comparative assessment of human resources structures" (A/73/366). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 21 September 2018.

2. The Advisory Committee recalls that in his initial report on management reform the Secretary-General set out a series of proposals, including the replacement of the existing Department of Management and Department of Field Support with two new departments, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support (A/72/492, para. 79). In paragraph 4 of its resolution 72/266 A, the General Assembly stated that it looked forward to receiving a comprehensive report on the proposals for its consideration.

3. Pursuant to resolution 72/266 A, the Secretary-General submitted a report entitled "Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: implementing a new management architecture for improved effectiveness and strengthened accountability" (A/72/492/Add.2). With regard to the proposals of the Secretary-General regarding human resources functions, the Advisory Committee recalls that, in its related report (A/72/7/Add.49, para. 34), it stated that it was not convinced of the effectiveness of the proposed separation of those functions among the Office of Human Resources of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Human Resources Services Division of the Department of Operational Support. The Committee recommended that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to consider consolidating human resources functions

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under a single administrative structure, with a view to ensuring a unified approach, optimizing the distribution of functions and avoiding duplication.

4. In its resolution 72/266 B, the General Assembly decided to approve the reorganization of the Department of Management and Department of Field Support into the proposed new Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and Department of Operational Support (para. 13) and approved the proposed new subsections 29A to 29D of section 29, Management and support services, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (para. 17; see also para. 10 below). The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit at the main part of its seventy-third session, for its consideration and decision, a comparative assessment of placing human resources functions in a single consolidated department or two distinct departments, with a view to ensuring a unified approach, optimizing the distribution of functions and avoiding duplication (para. 16).

5. The current report of the Secretary-General is submitted in response to the above-mentioned request. The Secretary-General discusses therein the existing structures at Headquarters, current challenges and structural approaches to addressing those challenges. With regard to the comparative assessment of human resources structures, information on the single structure approach is provided in paragraphs 21 and 22 and on the dual structure in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the report. **The Advisory Committee notes that the information contained in the report of the Secretary-General remains general in nature. Accordingly, the Committee trusts that full details on a comparative assessment of placing human resources functions in a single consolidated department or two distinct departments will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report. This should include further information on the coordination mechanisms to ensure effective feedback between the policy and operational functions, as well as on the entry point for Member States to discuss issues related to human resources policies and their implementation.**

6. In his report, the Secretary-General also discusses delegation of authority and accountability issues as they relate to his management reform proposals. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its report (A/72/885) on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Seventh progress report on the accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat: strengthening the accountability system of the Secretariat under the new management paradigm" (A/72/773), it made a number of observations and recommendations, including requests for further clarification, on the proposals of the Secretary-General for delegation of authority and accountability. The General Assembly, in its resolution 72/303, endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Committee's report. **The Advisory Committee trusts that further information on these issues will be provided to the General Assembly in the context of the next progress report of the Secretary-General on accountability.**

7. In its resolution 72/266 B, the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon at the main part of its seventy-fifth session. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the above-mentioned comprehensive review should include an in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of the coordination and feedback mechanisms in place between the policy and operational functions, as well as the extent to which the needs of all Secretariat entities are being met and are properly reflected in human resources policies, procedures and processes.**

8. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in section IV, paragraph 4, of its resolution 72/262 C, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a new proposal for the global service delivery model no later than at the first resumed part

of its seventy-third session. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that a new model for the delivery of administrative services could have an impact on the functioning and structures of the human resources function, as well as on delegation of authority and accountability issues.**

9. The Secretary-General requests the General Assembly to take note of his report on the comparative assessment of human resources structures. **In view of the request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 72/266 B (para. 16), the Advisory Committee considers that it is for the Assembly to decide on the action to be taken on the report of the Secretary-General.**

10. On a related matter, the Advisory Committee notes that no revision has been made to the introductory part of section 29 of the programme budget for 2018–2019 and trusts that the Secretary-General will make an appropriate proposal in this regard to the General Assembly.